International Counter-Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: Examining Radicalization in Kenya

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The African Leadership Centre (ALC) was established in Kenya in June 2010 as part of a joint initiative between King’s College London and the University of Nairobi. Its overall goal is to build a new community of leaders generating cutting-edge knowledge for peace, security and development in Africa. To that end, it works to build the capacity of individuals, communities and institutions across Africa which can contribute to peace and stability.

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# Table of Contents

**Introduction** ......................................................................................................................... 1

**Chapter One** .......................................................................................................................... 3

  - Background of the Study ........................................................................................................ 3
  - Rationale of the study ............................................................................................................. 4
  - Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 6

**Chapter Two** ........................................................................................................................ 8

  - A Conceptual Analysis: Probing the term “Radicalization” within shifting contexts .......... 8
    - Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 8
    - Radicalization: A mere rhetoric? ...................................................................................... 10
    - Radicalization within the context of terrorism ................................................................. 12
    - Linking Islamization and Radicalization ......................................................................... 15
    - From Radicalization to Violence ....................................................................................... 18

**Chapter Three** ..................................................................................................................... 21

  - Radicalization in Kenya: Examining the Pattern ................................................................. 21
    - Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 21
    - Kenya’s Islamic Political Dynamics ................................................................................ 22
    - The Spread of Radicalization in Kenya ........................................................................... 26
Chapter Four ........................................................................................................................................32
Radicalization and Counter-terrorism in Kenya..............................................................................32
  Introduction......................................................................................................................................32
  Countering Radicalization in Kenya ...............................................................................................34
  Counter-Terrorism efforts in Kenya .................................................................................................37
Chapter Five ......................................................................................................................................41
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................41
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................43
  Books, Journal articles and Reports ..............................................................................................43
  Online resources ............................................................................................................................47
Introduction

The growing dissatisfaction that followed the invasion of the US and its allies into Iraq and Afghanistan created a generation of spiteful individuals and groups of people who found no justification in the actions of the powerful nations. Different people will express dissatisfaction in different ways depending on the level of vengeance they are holding. While it is easier for some people to mule over their source of vengeance, perhaps quietly planning their revenge, others will hardly succeed in suppressing what they truly feel. Those that express themselves may choose to attack their perceived enemies by their words or deeds taking a more activist position. At the same time, the activists will usually have the support of a different group of people who are less likely to get out and do anything physical about their discontent. Nevertheless, this kind of support may give them some form of gratification from the feeling that they are united with the activists against a common enemy. Both of these parties can be said to be radicalized albeit on different levels of expressing it.

Radicalization is driven by a need to express certain level of disapproval for the way an authority manages a given situation. Radicalization will hardly take part in one individual and therefore comes through the influence of similar charged persons, sometimes in masses. In some instances, radicalization can be said to be a good aspect of the society especially if it influences positive change. But the way a population handles it could also mean that it can be disastrous and pose the potential to threaten security in not only a small community but globally as well. Violent radicalization can hardly be tolerated even in the most liberal society and terrorism can be said to be the worst extent that radicalization can go.

Discontent over the invasion into Iraq and Afghanistan has festered gradually giving rise to an ideology that would be used to recruit more and more individuals in anti-America rhetoric. It has also cultivated a pool of individuals in society that will sympathize with would-be terrorists hence ensured that attacks continue to take place in different corners of the globe. In response to this catastrophe, nations have been compelled to re-conceptualize their approach towards counter-terrorism approaches by infusing a component that seeks to prevent people from getting attracted into terrorist networks. As has been the case many a times before, Africa is the recipient of funding and other forms of support towards this end.
The Horn of Africa has particularly received attention in the last ten years for its vulnerability in providing spaces that extremists can operate in. Counter-radicalization efforts in this region are a necessary component in counter-terrorism strategies. However, it is important to recognize the points of departure in what defines radicalization within different societies so as to apply measures that are suited for their environment. This paper seeks to look at factors that make radicalization in the region slightly different from radicalization in say the Western nations or the Middle East. It however recognizes that there are factors which in the same breath make the process easier to identify as those factors apply uniformly across their geographical context. Finally, it is vital to note that radicalization in this study is limited to the contemporary debates on terrorism following attacks on the US in September 2001.
Chapter One

Background of the Study

The “War on terror,” first waged by George Bush’s administration after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America sought to stop terrorists from further attacks on the US. States that were accused of supporting terrorist activity became labeled as “evil” while the US marshaled the “good” nations to support it.¹ As a result, the US and its western allies invaded Afghanistan in November 2001 purportedly for supporting and hiding terrorists. Later in March 2003 Iraq became yet another victim when Saddam Hussein was accused of supporting terrorists. But what was purported to be a one man hunt for the leader of Al Qaeda and those in his network ended up being an ugly subjugation of people’s rights in the name of redeeming them.²

The US was able to advance its post-cold war hegemonic and geopolitical ambitions through the invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but such ambitions only succeeded in fuelling hostility and resistance as shown by a growing sense of discrimination against Muslims across the globe.³ The sense of hostility cultivated in these occurrences has allowed marginalized segments of Islamic societies to be manipulated in the age-old ideology of Jihad.⁴ Although there has not been an attack as big as the one that took place on September 11, the fear of looming attacks increased after the attacks in Madrid and London in the years 2004 and 2005 respectively.⁵ In between these attacks were many other smaller⁶ attacks that were attempted but decimated in time before any harm could be done.

The realization that the offensives being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the conditions that Muslims around the globe were being subjected to had created a greater problem than they were intended to solve. A new war was starting to be fought in protest of the methods employed by the US and its allies in the name of countering terrorism.⁷ Western

¹ Ayinde, O.A, (2010), p.51
⁴ De Waal, (2004), p.182
⁶ The term “smaller” here is used to denote the physical destruction caused by terrorism but not in essence of human lives lost. The term is also not used to discredit the value of one human life in comparison to many others.
powers also woke up to the reality that more needed to be done than just sending offensives to “enemy” states and subjecting Muslims to close scrutiny.\(^8\)

Counter-radicalization hence was born as a new approach to be employed within counter-terrorism efforts. Counter-radicalization was conceived around the idea that there was a need for a “hearts and minds” approach to reduce the pool of people who would readily embrace terrorist activity or protect terrorist networks.\(^9\) A “Hearts and minds” approach is more preconceived with tackling the root causes of terrorism than in mitigating the signs of imminent attacks or activity. Just like the notions of “terrorism” and “counter-terrorism in this context,” counter-radicalization became another idea originated from Western powers particularly the US, UK and with the Dutch. This approach quickly spread to the rest of the world as an additional mechanism in the quest to maintain international security. Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa has been targeted for counter-radicalization owing to its history of instability and proneness as a harbor for covert activities due to poor governance, weak state institutions, porous borders, civil unrests and presence of light weapons.\(^10\)

**Rationale of the study**

One cannot properly conceive of counter-radicalization without understanding what “radicalization” means. This study seeks to examine the concept of radicalization within the context of the Horn of Africa, and within the tenets of current underpinnings in debates on terrorism. The study argues that radicalization has been understood by the definitions given by western powers and as such, it does not capture the underlying issues that constitute radicalization in the Horn of Africa. It does not seek to disregard the similarities that exist in conceptualizing the term. However it recognizes that some crucial exemptions and inclusions to the existing definitions are significant so as to have a clear understanding within this particular regional context.

This study focuses on Kenya but it acknowledges that we cannot divorce a single state from the dynamics of the regional context of the horn. In this regard, it refers to the region as a whole in various occasions in order to stress certain points that make better sense when viewed from the broader perspective. Kenya is selected for its strategic positioning in the

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\(^10\) Ploch, L, (2010), p.27
Horn of Africa both physically and as a state that has shown interest in the mitigation of conflict in surrounding unstable states such as Sudan and Somalia.

The analysis made seeks to answer one main question; “what is the relevance of ongoing debates on radicalization in combating terrorist activities in Kenya?” This is followed by three more questions; “How can one identify radicalization in the Kenyan context?” “What if any, is the link between radicalization and terrorist activity in Kenya?” “Does understanding of radicalization influence the formulation of counter-terrorism approaches in Kenya?”

In an attempt to respond to these questions, the study shall examine existing literature on radicalization with the aim of investigating ongoing debates surrounding the concept. These debates shall then be placed in the Kenyan context with the intention of drawing a pattern of radicalization in this context. Incidences of terrorist activity in Kenya shall be analyzed for two intents; one is to try and link these activities to any identified pattern of radicalization and the second is to discuss counter-terrorism approaches that have been employed.

The study further aims at fulfilling the following objectives:

1. To investigate the concept of radicalization within the Kenyan context.
2. To analyze the spread of radicalization in Kenya
3. To examine the application of the concept of radicalization in counter-terrorism approaches

This is an important study because it challenges the direct importation of western ideas into a different region with limited knowledge of the challenges that are likely to be encountered in their application. Security is no longer a concern for only states with the greatest military capacity. It now comes with collective responsibility for all nations around the globe and calls for a careful scrutiny of all existing loopholes that could be exploited by members of terrorist networks. It comes at a timely moment when the focus is shifting from the Middle-east and turning to Africa which has seen increasing terrorist activity in the last couple of years.
Methodology

The motivation to carry out this study stems from observation and ongoing reports on the increasing terrorist related activity albeit of small magnitude in Kenya mainly due to its proximity with Somalia. The trend triggers questions regarding the steps that have been taken to curb terrorist activity in Kenya since the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998. Kenya is selected due to a number of factors that put it at the center of International security in as far as terrorist activity is concerned. Its proximity to Somalia; a robust economy that has got it ranked among emerging economies; its reputation as a regional hub connecting diverse international partners; apart from the post election violence in 2007 and early 2008, it has been held in high regard for remaining peaceful and stable while being surrounded by unstable states; and most importantly its diplomatic ties with surrounding states in the region makes it a strategic partner in international efforts to enforce peace and security. These factors have seen it play a mediator’s role of conflicts and a broker of peace in states such as Sudan and Somalia surrounding it.

Newspaper articles accessed online are resourceful in tracing incidences of terrorist activity and drawing on the trend it has taken. Journal articles and books will be essential in discussing the conceptual underpinnings surrounding radicalization as well as analyzing policy undertaken with effect to counter-terrorism. The study is taken as a partial fulfillment of a Masters degree within a period of three months subjecting it to time and financial constraints. It would have benefitted richly from primary data collection particularly from communities that have been directly impacted upon by terrorist activity in Kenya but it instead makes use of media reports as a basis for analysis in analyzing the closest there is to the reality on the ground.

The study assumes four distinct sections organized in four chapters and aimed at an in depth discussion on the topic of radicalization in the Horn of Africa. Each chapter deliberately covers issues that draw the reader closer to understanding radicalization as a component in terrorist related debates, its manifestation in Kenya and steps that have been taken to check it. The first chapter gives an overview of the study, highlighting what it aims to achieve in the end, the methods applied to do that and why this is important. The second chapter streamlines the approach taken in performing the study and engages the reader with the concept of radicalization as well as other significant issues surrounding the concept in terrorism debates. Chapter three seeks to investigate the occurrence of radicalization in Kenya through
investigations on affected populations, their geographical locations and the outcome of that radicalization process in the form of attacks by and arrests if suspected members of terrorist networks. Chapter four examines the measures taken to reduce the possibility of communities in Kenya being radicalized and extensively discusses the role of international players for the purpose of identifying the importation of foreign bred ideas into a local context. Finally the conclusion on chapter five brings together the main points from other chapters in order to take home the ultimate message that local terrorist related challenges have been tackled using foreign strategies.
Chapter Two

A Conceptual Analysis: Probing the term “Radicalization” within shifting contexts

Introduction

The framework within which this study is undertaken reflects dynamic perspectives of the concept of radicalization. It has been a challenge to clearly place any theories that explain radicalization except for similar proposals on causes, factors and drivers to radicalization. The one consensus in all contexts is that radicalization does not take a standard pathway in every individual or group. Consequently defining the concept will form a framework that goes further that just describing radicalization but also to understand how it has been treated in different contexts. As definitions are mainly associated with Western states, the same arguments will form a foundation from which to analyze this concept within the Horn of Africa. The study will take a critical position to qualify points at which existing conceptions of the term do not reflect the reality in the Horn of Africa. Radicalization is a broad concept but it will be narrowed in this case to reflect arguments based on terrorist activity particularly since the attacks on the US in September 2001.

Debates on terrorism have been shaped by Western powers and intellectuals, compelling our understanding on this subject to be influenced by literature produced in the US, or in European countries such as the UK or France. According to George Bush’s administration in the US, the “war on terror” was about the west, its civilization and values and other states were expected to support it otherwise they would be viewed as “evil.”11 Although radicalization is seen as distinct from terrorism, the two blend into each other necessitating combined analysis and discussions.

The state of current global security as evidenced by all manner of terrorist linked attacks has brought this subject closer to our doorsteps making it a part of many households’ discussions. This has almost created the impression that terrorism or terrorist activity is a fairly new phenomenon in social and political history. But this is far from the truth as the international

community is said to have been attempting a definition of the concept for over 80 years.\textsuperscript{12} This makes the existence of terrorism older than the cold war or the “war on terror.”

Ayinde, O.A, outlines a history of terrorism on the African continent through three distinct phases which he calls the Afro-Oriental, Afro-Occidental and Afro-global. The history discussed in his study seeks to demonstrate that terrorism has taken place on the African continent before the US declared “war on terror.” Afro-Oriental terrorism occurred both in two ways, first through terror being occasioned by the incursion of Arabs in search of slaves in Sub-Sahara Africa. The Arabs terrorized black African populations forcing them into slavery with the complicity of some black Africans. The second form of Afro-Oriental terrorism involved cannibalism although it did not include any violence or insecurity in the community. Instead Africans who carried out cannibalism on their fellow Africans were known for their sense of justice and fairness as described by Ibn Batuta, a Northern African explorer who shares his ordeals in early African history. The appearance of Europeans for the enslavement of Africans represents the Afro-Occidental phase and eventually gives way to the Afro-global phase of terrorism. The Afro-global phase is characterized by colonialism, under which many Africans were wiped through brutal force.\textsuperscript{13} Such African experiences are significant as they suggest the need to appreciate local dimensions of political violence. The lessons demonstrated also show that domestic acts of terrorism are not always led by groups such as Al Shabaab or Al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{14}

Africans continued to experience terrorism during their national liberation struggles and well into their independence.\textsuperscript{15} This led to liberation movements that sought to obtain freedom from the imperialist, often employing tactics that had them labeled as terrorists. As a result former African liberation fighters inspired by Nelson Mandela, expressed their unease with global definitions of terrorism.\textsuperscript{16} Most existing definitions would have concurred with white Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa, the British in Kenya and French in Algeria in branding their former struggles with Africans as “terrorism.” It is by no chance that the Algiers Convention which produced the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of

\textsuperscript{12} Lumina, C, (2007), p. 36
\textsuperscript{13} Ayinde, A.O, (2010), p.59
\textsuperscript{14} Smith, S.M, (2010), p.106
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid
\textsuperscript{16} De Waal 2004, p. 235
Terrorism defined “terrorism” taking care to exclude national liberation movements and leaders who had bitterly won independence, and continued to support the Palestinian cause.17

Radicalization: A mere rhetoric?

Radicalization involves a transition from being merely passive or ‘moderate’ to extremism or militancy and includes the use of violence to demonstrate their grievances. The process of radicalization and recruitment is highly complex and different in various parts of the world. From a report issued by the Dutch Intelligence Service (AIVD), radicalization is the quest to drastically alter society, possibly through the use of unorthodox means, which can result in a threat to democratic structures and institutions.18 Radicalization has become a dominant narrative in the ongoing debates on terrorism and has borne further “counter-radicalization” as a measure in counter-terrorism strategies.

Radicalization is by no means a new term in political history. In the mid-1970s to 80s during the recession in Britain, radicalism/radicalization was defined within the precincts of attitudinal changes and actions taken to protest cut backs on public spending. Analysis carried out between private sector and public sector producers and consumers, or between employers and their employees revealed that public spenders and consumers as employees were more radical than those from the private sector and employers respectively.19 The study carried out on radicalism/radicalization in Britain makes the observation that the structure of radicalism is different from the process of radicalization. It also stresses that identifying radicalism was a lot easier than identifying the process of radicalization.20 Radicalization is regarded as a process rather than an end product according to this study.

Similarly in the 1830s and 40s, African-Americans were in the vanguard of radicalization during the abolitionist movement. Radicalization during this time in America’s history was induced by violence and suffering of the “Negroes”. In this regard, violence existed in the form of “threat” of physical violence, and “verbal abuse” while frustration came in the form of feelings of humiliation, rage, and terror. These factors drove black Americans towards

17 Article 3 (1) of the OAU Convention on Terrorism, Algiers 1999
18 Korteweg, R, (2010), p. 28
20 Ibid, p. 508
radicalism and more intense extremism. In this context, black abolitionists were considered radical for holding different views from white abolitionists. Radicalization was a product of the ethos of the abolitionist crusade, the goals they intended to be achieved and the methods that were used in accomplishing objectives.

In relation to student activism and how social violence control influences students, Admek and Lewis describe radicalization as a move of political orientation to the left as people increasingly come to question the legitimacy of existing governmental institutions and processes and become more accepting of the use of violence as a political technique to achieve change. In this study too, attitudes feature quite prominently as one of the aspects of a radicalized individual. The findings in this particular study suggest that the more people are exposed to violent situations especially to control social violence, the more likely they are to become radicalized into using force to influence change.

Following these observations, the concept of radicalization has been applied in various contexts to describe a group of people whose views differ from the views of those in the mainstream or to a ruling authority, particularly the government. A broad definition that encompasses political extremism and social polarization without necessarily focusing on counter-terrorism terms radicalization as a process by which one goes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist with an intent or support for violence. In current politics and global affairs, radicalization has come to be understood as a component in the fight against terrorist activities. The two terms, “terrorism” and “radicalization” have become so intermarried in security debates that it becomes difficult to divorce one from the other.

A solid definition that features in analyzing radicalization is provided by Mandel, D.R (p. 105) Radicalization: What does it mean? in his description of a radical as an “extreme, relative to something that is defined or accepted as normative, traditional or valued as the status quo.” Radicalization within this definition can be seen as the process by which an individual becomes an extremist relative to something that is defined or accepted as normative, traditional or valued as the status quo. A radical can also be understood as “a

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22 Ibid, P. 198
24 Ibid p. 346
person harboring a deep-felt desire for fundamental sociopolitical changes,” while radicalization is also seen as “a growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to the existing order.”27

**Radicalization within the context of terrorism**

The quest to end terrorist and extremist activities led to the idea that people are first radicalized before they commit acts of terror. The development of this idea has become an axis from which counter-terrorism measures now being dubbed “counter-radicalization” have been formed. This follows the declaration that terrorism cannot be fought only through military might, but may require the use of a “hearts and minds” approach in order to neutralize communities that may silently support terrorist activity without necessarily undertaking such roles themselves.

The National Security Preparedness Group defines radicalization as a process by which individuals become political extremists either by way of their ideas or methods.28 It is believed that ideas and methods are hardly divorced from each other. Extremism in this regard refers to political ideas or ideologies that oppose society’s core values and principles. Counter-radicalization in turn, refers to the process seeking to prevent non-radicalized populations from being radicalized.29 Most importantly, the US recognizes radicalization as a process and every individual takes a unique path to radicalize making it difficult to draw a standard pathway to radicalization. At best, radicalization is identified by a set of drivers, or prevailing conditions that become the push-over for vulnerable individuals from peaceful activism, to tacit support, then material support, and finally to active participation in acts of violence.30

One study suggests multiple pathways towards radicalization found at the origin of the radicalization process using a framework of a number of possible contributing variables. The four factors identified are divisions, grievances, narratives and means.31 These factors are further broken down to drivers of radicalization and classified as follows; Divisions include lack of integration, “ghettoisation,” internal community divides, identity crises, isolation,

27 Dalgaard-Nielsen, (2010), p. 798
28 Neuman, P, (2011)
29 Ibid, p.16
30 Neuman, P, (2011), p.15
31 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, PPN Working paper
weak community leadership and infrastructure. Drivers that contribute to grievance as a factor that influences the pathway to radicalization include; underemployment, poor education, political and democratic disenfranchisement, discrimination, foreign policy and international conflicts and disputes. Narratives employed are in the form of political movements, ideologies and faith while the means through which radicalization may occur is through; social or family or criminal networks, vulnerable or risky individuals, institutions or places and charismatic individuals. It is unlikely that in any one context all of these factors will influence a group or individual towards radicalization. Instead, it will be expected that each pathway will be influenced by a unique set of drivers depending on the environment.

The US in particular has been challenged in its conceptualization of radicalization considering the history it has gone through in becoming the superpower it is today. The example given earlier of the black abolitionists that were considered as radicals in the 1830s and 40s define some of the core values that have come to be associated with the US. Freedom of expression can be said to be the beacon forming the foundation upon which the US was formed. Yet counter-radicalization threatens this freedom by way of victimizing individuals who do not conform to the norms set out in society. “Drivers of radicalization” have been examined as a way to mitigate those drivers that are likely to lead an individual to becoming violently radicalized and in some instances embracing extremist ideology.

The UK has championed the fight against radicalization through the special branch known as prevent in its counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Within UK policy, radicalization is now understood as a process through which some people come to support and sometimes take part in terrorism. The threat of terrorism in the UK has been rated as severe following growing support which is identified through rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and parliamentary democracy. Ideology has been identified as a major driver of radicalization within this scope. Drawing from Heywood, A, (2007), Political Ideologies: An introduction, the UK’s policy on radicalization describes ideology as the centre of any group or movement and responsible for providing a group’s members with a set of ideas that act as the basis for

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32 Ibid, p. 2
33 Neuman, P, (2011)
34 HM Government paper, July 2011, p.36
35 HM Paper, June 2011, p. 13
political action. Within this kind of ideology lie certain grievances that may be real or perceived but by no means justifying terrorism.

In countries such as the US, UK and Denmark, radicalization continues to be considered as a critical aspect in the quest to end terrorist and extremist groups and individuals that have been responsible for terrorist attacks across the globe. Denmark has been popular for its “hearts and minds” approach towards counter-terrorism including vouching for dialogue between perceived terrorists and their subjects. It has lately incorporated within its counter-terrorism strategy a de-radicalization approach which at the time of investigation was still underway. The Danish position on radicalization is based upon the assumption that certain conditions breed permissive breeding grounds for extremists to be radicalized and views the main challenge as building a cohesive community so as to neutralize these conditions.

The place for radicalization in contemporary African politics has mainly been shaped in the definition given by western powers who have been the main financiers of counter-terrorism strategies on the continent. The US Deputy assistant secretary for African affairs, Karl E. Wycoff however recently came short of acknowledging that this was a wrong approach when he spoke against a “one-size-fits-all” approach to counter-radicalization in Africa. It is this dependence on “imported” conceptualizations of the term radicalization that has brought about counter-radicalization approaches that are mainly suited for their originating countries.

Attempts at studying radicalization in Africa have been made along religious lines, and based on their causes, “drivers” and “signposts”. Scholars hold a diversity of views in this subject, making it an ongoing debate that can be perceived from a number of perspectives. Radicalization in the Horn of Africa is a complex process that cannot be understood without considering the significance of radical Islam in the region. This view however differs from that of other scholars on the African continent who acknowledge the plurality of the concept in the region. Ismail, O, (2012) in an unpublished write up carries out a study that aims at analyzing the dynamics of radicalization without a bias on its relationship with religion but nevertheless ends up discussing political Islam in most of his work. This partially

36 Ibid, p. 35
37 The Danish Government, May 2012, p.5
38 Karl E. Wycoff’s, while making his opening remarks at the International Workshop to Prevent Youth Radicalization in East Africa, an event organized by the African Centre for Strategic Studies in Kigali, Rwanda on 23rd January 2012. The Speech can be heard on this link http://africacenter.org/2012/01/preventing-youth-radicalization-in-east-africa-2/ accessed on 5th August 2012.
demonstrates the challenge in divorcing current perceptions of radicalization within the context of terrorism but by no means does it translate into a definite given status about the relationship between religion (particularly Islam) with radicalization.

Literature that has engaged in terrorism and radicalization discourse in contemporary studies has hardly done so without discussing political Islam. The justification in these claims is based on the pattern observed in terrorist activities which tend to indicate that attacks in the contemporary understanding of terrorism are more likely to be by Muslims than any from other religions. Arguments have been made against such claims based on the use of terrorism during earlier times of the Christian crusades. For the purpose of this study, it is necessary to attempt a brief study into the relationship between Islam and radicalization and to further examine the relationship within the Horn of Africa.

**Linking Islamization and Radicalization**

Academic literature, policy papers, media reports and even works of fiction have one thing in common when they address issues of terrorism and radicalization. The words Islam or Muslim have feature frequently as a subject at the centre of many of the discussions/debates. This follows the prevailing pattern of terrorist profiles that have mostly been Muslims and enlisted terrorist networks such as AL Qaeda, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab also Muslim. In addition to this, pro-Muslim ideology that condemns Western civilization and seeks to forcefully engrain Muslim law among citizens of particular nations has also constituted to the association of terrorism with Islam.\(^{41}\) This does not by any means categorize all Muslims as terrorists as a significant amount Muslims have publicly refused to support such activities and campaigned against the use of force on innocent people.\(^{42}\)

The US had a perception that (hardcore) Islam is not only incapable of modernity, but resistant to it as described in Mahmood Mamdani’s book, *Good Muslim, bad Muslim*. It is this perception that leads president George Bush in the aftermath of September 2001 attacks to lead a campaign dubbed The “Global war on terror” (sometimes acronymized as GWOT) or the “War on terror.” In this campaign, President Bush chastises “enemies of the US” and labels them “evil” while the US is labeled as “good.” This rhetoric is based on the view as

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\(^{42}\) Ombati, C, Daily Nation Newspaper, 7\(^{th}\) August 2012
held by the US led by President Bush that Islam is not simply a religious or cultural identity but rather, a political one yet terror itself has political dimensions.\textsuperscript{43} In fact, western states have had a long history of viewing Islam as a problem based on European Christians’ refusal to accept Mohammed as a true prophet. Consequently, the relationship between western states and Islam has been a pendulum dominated by conflict arising from cultural, religious and ideological factors but also with moments of realpolitik and interstate interests.\textsuperscript{44}

The evolution of Islam into anti-western and particularly anti-American and anti-Israeli Islamic militancy has been regarded as paradoxical, sometimes giving rise to radicalization.\textsuperscript{45} Attempts have been made to understand the underlying factors associated with radicalization by studying two main Islamic camps; the Sunnis and the Shii’s, based on their belief in the four caliphs who succeeded Mohamed. The Sunnis believe in the teachings of all the four Caliphs but the Shiites only believe in the fourth Caliph, Ali.\textsuperscript{46} The Sunnis are the most prevailing and politically dominant group of the two camps and not surprisingly, the more militant of the two groups even though the Shii’s were known for their suicidal militancy in the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{47}

Fundamentalist Islam became recognized as a significant security threat in the aftermath of the cold war. The views held on the threat of political Islam are based on fundamentalist Islam’s abjuration of western civilization. The origins of this phenomenon can be traced back to the sense of attachment to the umma of believers (Islamic community) that Islam conferred upon Muslims before the fall of the Ottoman Empire. This also coincided with the formation of the Israel state in 1948, putting an end to Arab liberalism and giving way to radical Arab nationalism.\textsuperscript{48} After reaching its peak in the 1950s, Arab nationalism reached a bitter end after the 6 days war in 1967 and gave way for militant Islamism which came into force in countries governed by fundamentalists. In that political environment, the fundamentalists ruled with three objectives in mind; to overthrow the ruling political elite, elimination of western political and cultural influences and re-introduction of Sharia (law) Islamic rule.\textsuperscript{49}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43}Mamdani, M (2004), p.253
\item \textsuperscript{44}Gerges, F.A, (1997), p. 68
\item \textsuperscript{45}Lynch, M, (2010)
\item \textsuperscript{46}Colquhoun, A.R, (1906), p. 908
\item \textsuperscript{47}Haddad, S and Khashan, H, (2002), p. 812
\item \textsuperscript{48}Khashan, H, (1997), p.10
\item \textsuperscript{49}Ibid, p. 13
\end{itemize}
Islamic militancy has been justified under the doctrine of Jihad a central pillar of Islam which has in turn influenced Salafi-jihadism. \(^{50}\) Ayoob, M (2005), argues that mainstream Islamist movements such as Jama’at-i-Islami and the Muslim brotherhood are reformist groups rather than radical groups. \(^{51}\) The Muslim Brotherhood has been strongly opposed to the methods employed by Al Qaeda and renounced them even if they believe in the obligation of jihad within the right context. \(^{52}\) In this sense, most Islamist groups are committed to the accomplishment of the Islamic state or Islamizing existing states but radical Islamists go further and launch terror missions in the name of a holy mission. It is important to also add that the US has been blamed for creating fertile grounds for the formation of Al Qaeda when it sponsored a jihad against Soviet Union in Afghanistan and ultimately led to the collapse of the Afghan state.\(^{53}\)

One author captures all that can be said regarding Islam militancy in the following statement;

> “Militant Islamism is centred on a narrative, which claims that Islam and Muslims are constantly attacked and humiliated by the West, Israel, and corrupt local regimes in Muslim countries. It claims that in order to return to a society of peace, harmony, and social justice, Muslims need to unite and stand up for their faith. They need to fight the West and other corrupting influences. Violence, including violence against civilians, is a necessary and legitimate means given the superior military power of the West. The fight, which militant Islamism claim is a religiously sanctioned fight, is an individual duty and an emancipatory journey, which brings the fighter closer to God.”\(^{54}\)

This background provides a clearer understanding as to how radical Islamists belief in launching terror missions for a holy cause might influence some of the occurrences that have been observed in recent times. Most fundamentalist groups will employ violence to promote change towards the right path. Jihad is believed to be sanctioned by God and the only means through which most fundamentalists can resurrect the Islamic state devoid of western

\(^{50}\) Lynch, M, (2010), p.474  
\(^{51}\) Ayoob, M (2005), p.954  
\(^{52}\) Lynch, M, (2010), p.474  
\(^{53}\) Ayoob, (2005), p. 954  
\(^{54}\) Dalgaard-Nielsen, A,(2010), p. 798
civilization. Muslims who have already embraced this ideology become an easy target for such radical Islamist groups especially when their social and economic conditions are below standard. The next section attempts to investigate some of the recognizable highlights that indicate the path towards radicalization and into the violence seen in terrorist groups. This is done within the framework of theories associated with conflict as well as some of the proposed pathways towards violence radicalization by scholars in the field.

From Radicalization to Violence

Despite the diversity of literature on radicalization, authors concede to its complexity and recognize that it does not always lead to violence. This means that not all radicals turn terrorist but all terrorists undergo radicalization making terrorism the worst plausible outcome of the radicalization process.

No universal standard of determining the path taken by an individual or group towards radicalization exists. Drivers of radicalization have provided a more informed approach in understanding the factors underlying the process of radicalization. Drivers provide a sense of why certain environments are identified as more vulnerable to the occurrence of radicalization. Perceptions of grievance, Ideology or extremist narrative and social groups’ dynamics are three salient features that act as drivers towards radicalization. The British Government’s report on the Prevent strategy, indicates that radicalization is driven by ideology which sanctions the use of violence by propagandists and by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which make that ideology seem rather attractive and compelling. Ideology is a common feature in both these views, indicating that all other drivers are more likely to lead into radicalization in the presence of ideology.

Studies have raised a number of questions in an attempt to probe why certain individuals opt for a more violent way of expressing themselves than others. One of these studies is centered on Europe where he observes that plotted terrorist attacks have been carried out by young well-educated and apparently well-integrated Europeans who are not socio-economically

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56 European Commission, (2008), p.4
58 HM Government, (June 2011), p.5
deprived or repressed in any way. These young men have hardly spent any time outside Europe but they have embraced militant Islamism and radicalized very fast. This scenario rules out the use of grievance as a driver for radicalization within this context. Still one may argue that even while the young Europeans referred to in this case may not necessarily have grievances in the sense that Paul Collier discusses *Greed and Grievance* theory, the actors may feel that they represent other Muslims that actually have grievances based on their socio-economic status.

In a similar study on the US, investigations show the factors underlying radicalization of converts and non-converts of Americans into Sunni Militancy. It comes to an identical solution as one observed in the earlier study on Europe that poverty, perceived oppression and social alienation are not driving factors in the US. Instead he points at group dynamics which indicate that Americans that have been converted into Islam are more likely to radicalize individually while those that are not Islam converts are mainly radicalized within certain social circles. Nevertheless, approximately 90 percent of Muslim converts and 94 percent of non-converts undergo group-level radicalization.

From these studies, one may argue that ideology is a compelling driver in radicalizing individuals in the US and the UK, but group dynamics are more salient in the US. This leaves out the perception of grievance which has been associated with poverty and political oppression of a people. The Horn of Africa seems to fit within this context as theory and as evidence in this study shows. Many more factors act as drivers for radicalization in Africa as demonstrated by such authors as Ismail, O, Abdisaid, M. A and Tadesse, M. Though the ideology of society’s moral decay based on conformity with westernization has been at the backbone of extremist groups’ campaigns, they have succeeded in recruiting followers based on other drivers in addition to those observed in the west.

Economic decline, violent conflicts and lack of legitimate states provide a ripe background upon which the process of radicalization has taken place in the Horn of Africa. Against this background, issues of marginalization and linkages to Middle Eastern extreme interpretations of the Quran have ensured radicalization takes place at individual and group levels. This occurs through the learning process that begins in *madrassas* and also in young adults though

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59 Daulgard-Nielsen, N, (2010)
60 Ibid, p. 798
62 Ibid, p.290
63 Tadesse, M, (2011), p.4
indoctrination of the ideological stance that condemns corruption, mismanagement and injustice. These can be classified as some of the drivers towards radicalization in Kenya. Charting a clear path that is taken by an individual towards radicalization is challenging. However the conditions described herein can be identified as some of the factors that create an enabling environment for individuals to support terrorism either by way of carrying out attacks, helping with the planning and logistics or simply sheltering active terrorists from being discovered.

\[\text{Abdisaid, A, M, (2008), p.4}\]
Chapter Three

Radicalization in Kenya: Examining the Pattern

Introduction

Having looked at factors that influence the radicalization process in various contexts, it is useful to investigate the process of radicalization in the Horn of Africa for the purpose of highlighting common trends and points of departure from the west. This enables the study to fulfill the objective of examining the relevance of counter-terrorism efforts in the region with regard to radicalization. It follows the understanding that counter-terrorism approaches with a counter-radicalization component will only be effectively designed if the factors influencing radicalization are well outlined within their specific context.

This section attempts to put into perspective a number of factors that have influenced the radicalization process within the region. It assumes that radicalization takes place in individuals or groups by the time they engage in or get to support terrorist activity. Above all, as evidence will show later on in this section of the study, terrorist activity in the Horn of Africa has mostly been carried out by individuals hailing from an Islamic background similar to the pattern in Europe and the US. The factors studied will therefore pay an amount of attention to the structure of Islam in the region but will also investigate other related factors that are not necessarily linked to any religion or group. While the study reflects on patterns in the Horn of Africa, Kenya is the focus due to a number of constraints that dictate the size of this study.

While the study focuses on Kenya, references are made from other states in the Horn of Africa particularly Somalia because of the intertwined nature of the two countries when it comes to discussing this subject. One can hardly separate Al Shabaab activities in Kenya and Somalia as the group has transcended the border in not only carrying out attacks but also in the recruitment of operatives. Yet another factor linking Kenya and Somalia closely is the level of refugee immigrants from Somalia into Kenya, some of whom have integrated well
into their host country but continue to fuel strong links with their homeland. This creates a web of inter-linkages that are at best examined simultaneously.

Radicalization has been described as a process as opposed to an end product of a process. Identifying stages of radicalization is a challenging task as it is likely to take place discretely within the larger society that continues to function as expected. The only way to be certain that radicalization is ongoing is unfortunately after incidences of terrorist related attacks have taken place. This follows an earlier finding that all terrorists have undergone a radicalization process but not all who have undergone the process are terrorists. Due to the challenges associated with identifying an ongoing radicalization process, this study attempts to look into the pattern of radicalization in Kenya by analyzing the areas and populations that seem to have been mostly involved. The goal is to ultimately draw a pattern that indicates which are the most vulnerable populations when it comes to radicalization within the context of terrorism.

Kenya’s Islamic Political Dynamics

Islam was first introduced along the coasts of the Horn of Africa by Arab traders in the 7th century and later spread inland. Significant contact between the Coast and Islamic heart lands is traced back to the 9th to 14th centuries and was influenced by the Arabs. The strongest and original footholds of Islam are said to have been in Somali’s coast as the first commercial centers of interest in the region. According to Jamalilyl, A.B, in Penetration of Islam in East Africa, Muslims in the Horn of Africa fall with in Sunni, Shia and Ibadhi camps. Further smaller groups are Sufis and Ismailis, with the Sunnis being the dominant group in the region.

The spread of Islam in the Horn of Africa unlike what happened in North Africa and the Middle East took place peacefully rather than through Jihad. It is as deep rooted as Christianity and its application also runs as deep. Islam has been accommodative and in return been accommodated by native cultures and customs as they have co-existed in relatively peaceful condition with each other in the Horn of Africa. Kenyan history in particular is not marked with any religiously influenced conflict and the Muslims have co-

existed Christians in relative harmony except for recent attacks on churches by alleged terrorists in North Eastern and Coast provinces of Kenya.

Evidence of Muslim population can be found in academic work as well as national reports carried out at different points in time. A study carried out in 1984 to investigate economic and social ties that bound Kenyan Coastal people in the 19th century revealed that Islam was an inter-ethnic link which influenced people to a point of carrying out trade together as parity in religion made people to cooperate with each other.67 This can be used to explain why to this date Muslims can be found lumped together in specific geographical areas than in the rest of the country. More recently, demographics of Muslim population have been shown to vary in the region however the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics analysis on the 2009 census indicate that the percentage of Muslims to other religious affiliations is at 11% of the total population in the country.68 Nairobi, Coast Province and North Eastern bear the highest numbers of Muslim population at 85% of the total Muslim Population in the country. Of these, Nairobi holds 5% of them, Coast province 24% and North Eastern at 56% of the total Muslim population in the country.69

Muslims in the greater Horn of Africa started to face marginalization under the imperialist rule with the collaboration of local allies. During the colonial period, Muslims were discriminated against in Mission schools that educated local populations for clerical, civil service and teaching jobs who emerged as the middle class at the time. This continued after independence where education and employment opportunities were scarce leading them to assume the role of a regional underclass.70 This has seen the politics of Jihad first introduced in the region, and as De Wal, A, (2004) puts it, “the politics of Jihad is local, rooted in the grievances and strategies of certain individuals and groups.”71 North Eastern and Coast provinces which have some of the most marginalized populations in Kenya have the highest numbers of Muslim populations. The Kenya Open Data initiative which was started in July 2011 to provide free data through an online portal shows that some of the poorest districts in 2005/6 included Turkana, Mandera, Kwale, Isiolo, Gucha and Taveta, all districts within North Eastern and Coast Provinces.72

68 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics website
69 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Population by Religious affiliation and Province
70 Dickson, D, (2005), p.4
71 De Waal, N, (2004), p.182
72 Poverty rate by Districts, Kenya Open data, 2011.
Despite the combination of figures and theory which tends to argue that the social-economic status of Muslims in Kenya would be a source of grievance which has been known to brew violence, they have not been a major source of any political unrest in the country. More attention was paid to the Muslim population after the first terrorist attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam when those arrested for allegedly being involved were found to be Muslims. It has been argued that Muslims in the region and indeed in Kenya have been influenced by others from; Somalia, the Middle East, the US and UK and other diasporas where Muslims have widely relocated.

As soon as the end of the cold war, violent Islamic Jihadists took the opportunity to subdue nations which became “abandoned” by the superpowers once the conflict between them ended. The Wahhabist trained in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and other Gulf States poured into Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Kenya with significant amounts of financial and military resources.⁷³ Sudan is said to have been used as a base by Osama bin Laden between 1991 and 1996, a time when the ground was set for the attacks on the capital cities of Kenya and Tanzania to later take place. Al Qaeda was reported to have established “terror centers” with as many as 10 to 15 terrorist “sleeper cells” by 2005. Some of those centers showed activity going by reports of an alleged terrorist attack plot on the new US embassy in Gigiri using a truck filled with explosives and a bomb laden airplane in June 2003.⁷⁴

The porosity of borders in the region, inadequate policing and widespread corruption are some of the factors that have made Kenya an attractive destination for terrorist networks. When states fail to provide social services and are corrupt, vulnerable segments of the population become attracted by Islamist groups who set up charitable organizations which help the needy and provide unavailable services but use these as an avenue to spread radical ideology. At the same such “failed states” harbor terrorists that have been sponsored by international networks and create terrorist threats across the globe.⁷⁵ Al Shabaab’s original members were former Somali soldiers who fought the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan and returned to Somalia in the late 90s bringing with them radical ideology.⁷⁶ Others in Al Shabaab’s top leadership are said to have fought and trained abroad with terrorist groups in Al Qaeda and other foreign groups providing training, equipment and other forms of support.

⁷⁴ Rosenau, W, (2005), p. 2
⁷⁵ Howard, T, (2010), p. 962
Iran, Syria, Libya and Eritrea are some of the countries who are accused of having supported Al Shabaab in UN reports.  

The Somali Diaspora has also been held responsible for financial and logistical support for Al Shabaab with Eastleigh (in Nairobi) and Dubai communities providing significant contributions. 14 people in the US were charged with providing money, personnel and services to Al Shabaab. Those that were accused defended themselves with the claim that they were fundraising for charity to go towards helping the poor. Reports however revealed that seven of them who were arrested had left the US to join Al Shabaab in Somalia and five out of those seven pleaded guilty to the charges.

At the same time various reports have been made to the effect that Al Shabaab is composed of Somalis and foreigners such as Americans and Britons. The US Congress in 2010 indicated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had reported that “the number of persons believed to have left the United States for Somalia in recent years is comparatively larger than the numbers who have gone to other conflict zones.” This was coupled with the claim that the US was increasingly seeing Americans seek to raise funds and get recruited into Al Shabaab. Up to 50 Americans were believed to have been fighting with Al Shabaab at the time. The UK also has made similar claims as seen on a report released by the BBC showing that a similar number of Britons were fighting as Al Shabaab members in Somalia and were likely to return to Britain to attempt and carry out attacks as “lone wolves.”

Terrorist activity in Kenya is a function of international linkages demonstrated in this section. The next sub-section attempts to map the spread of radicalization in Kenya. This is a difficult task that requires very focused and detailed information gathering to come up with a consistent pattern, however it will examine the factors that underpin radicalization in Kenya, affected groups and the most affected areas. Evidence from media reports will form the greater proportion of reference for this purpose.

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77 Un Security Council, S/2010/91  
78 Ibid, p. 8  
79 BBC Online News, 5th August 2010  
80 Ploch, L, (2010), p. 10  
81 BBC Online News, 5th August 2010
The Spread of Radicalization in Kenya

Contrary to some of the existing arguments on what causes terrorism, poverty has been ruled out as a primary factor causing terrorism. Most of the terrorist activities in recent times have been championed by citizens of one of the wealthiest nations in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia. Citizens of Western states, Japan and the US, have also been involved in terrorism, further indicating that terrorism is not a preserve for the poor.  

Poverty has however been exploited by leaders of terrorist networks to win the “hearts and minds” of vulnerable groups of people who are plagued by multiple conditions that make violence very attractive.

Terrorism and other crises in the Horn of Africa have mainly been attributed to weakness of states, their failure and collapse. This has lead to militarization of states and blurred legislative, executive and judiciary boundaries. Such states fail to protect their citizens, their boundaries especially from arms transfer and other crimes such as looting and cattle rustling which is a major source of insecurity on Kenya’s border towns with Uganda and Somalia. Security challenges are made more complicated by the ease of arming that takes place among civilians even when they do not necessarily have a war mentality.  

Human Rights (2002) reported that Kenya has an undocumented amount arms flowing into the country in clandestine operations. Such failure by the state to protect its citizens pushes them to instill their own security systems sometimes leading to armed violence. The Kuria people in Kenya result to dealing with the problem of cattle rustling on their own by ensuring that a lot of their people own guns to protect their wealth in their traditional “warrior” mentality. The government is in turn forced to tolerate this situation which is responsible for a dangerous trend of armed civilians.

Kenya particularly provides a strategic avenue for terrorist networks searching for a hub for various reasons: Its position on the map places it in the middle of the Horn of Africa, a region afflicted by civil unrests over long periods of time. This has contributed to the problem of arms proliferation in the country; Kenya’s capital city Nairobi, is abuzz with activity from a variety of interests all around the globe. This has made it target destination and its cosmopolitan nature allows all people to blend in without suspicion. In addition to this Nairobi is quite advanced technologically, a feature that terrorist networks are keen to exploit.

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82 Clapham, C, (2003), p. 6
84 Ibid, p.195
in planning their activities. Kenya also has a corrupt and ineffectual security and justice system, porous borders, a large population of Somali refugees that have been integrated into the society and strong ties between Somalis in Kenya with their kin in the Diaspora.

State weakness gives rise to inbred terror as well as international networks. Classified as a weak rather than failed state due to poor institutional structures, Kenya offers a sanctuary and succor to terror movements due to the absence of a vibrant local authority which allows external actors and paramilitaries to continue operating unabated.\(^{86}\) It is also seen as a point of transition for would be Jihadists who have been recruited abroad on their way to Somalia for training.\(^{87}\) Other arguments suggest that Somali is not too permissive an environment due to the lack of government which inhibits rather than facilitates terrorist groups. Due to its instability, it precludes the presence of many expatriates making foreign jihadis vulnerable.\(^{88}\)

This reality shifts the focus from Somalia and back to the marginalized Kenyan North Eastern strip which borders Somalia, has the highest Muslim population in the country and harbors a large number of Somali refugees. Following the collapse of the Somali Government in 1991, Al Itihaad Al Islamiya (AI AI) or Islamic Union emerged as the most militant Islamist group and a major military force and was described by the US as an ally of Al Qaeda. AI AI was blamed for providing logistic support to Al Qaeda in the 1998 bombing as well as the 2002 attacks at the Coast province. But to showcase the extent of radicalization within this context is the allegation that AI AI is active in North Eastern Province and continues to garner support for its vision of a pan-Somali Islamic Caliphate.\(^{89}\)

The existence of terrorist networks; including support and sympathy for them especially among the Muslim populations in Kenya are widely held beliefs that yielded to open affirmation by the US ambassador to Kenya Ben Carson in 2003 among others.\(^{90}\) Al Shabaab was estimated to have several thousand fighters with several hundreds of them originating from foreign countries and predominantly from Kenya.\(^{91}\) Terrorists work within a well coordinated network of support composed of “operatives who recruit, raise funds, motivates arms, directs, covers tracks, take credit, publicizes and even compensates families.”\(^{92}\) A cell with members performing their various roles belongs to a larger organization that seeks to

\(^{86}\) Herbst, J and Mills, G, (2003), p.31
\(^{89}\) Medhane, T, (April 2011), p.9
\(^{91}\) Ploch, (Nov, 2010), p. 8
\(^{92}\) Berman, E, (2009), p.13
carry out a political agenda. The networks in Kenya have shown that Muslims especially from Nairobi and Coast province have been recruited to train alongside foreign nationals for terrorist networks. Al Shabaab militants were also operating and recruiting young Kenyans along the Kenya Somali border. 93 A sense of alienation that exists among Kenyan Muslims contributes as a recruitment drive and excuse for recruitment into terrorist networks. 94 It is difficult to prove the existence of Al Qaeda’s support in Kenya but suspicions of this led to closure of a number of Muslim initiated charities in the aftermath of the US terrorists attacks. Examples following attempted attacks, a number of successful attacks and arrests made show that there is indeed some terrorist activity going on in the country even though it is not large scale.

Investigations into patterns of radicalization in Kenya call for particular attention to be paid on the indication of terrorist activity in specific geographical areas, among certain social groups living in certain social-economic conditions. Reports by the media and studies carried out have shown that attacks in the country have in most cases been carried out either in Nairobi, Coast and Northeastern provinces. Not coincidentally, these are the areas that earlier in this study were marked for having the worst living conditions and poverty rates in the country. Kenyan interests have become targets for terrorist attacks as well as recruitment in recent times as shown by attacks from Al Shabaab militants in parts of the country.

In July 2012, about 40 men attacked a police post in North Eastern province and killed one of the police officers at the station while disguised in Transitional Federal Government police officers’ uniforms. The National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) later released a briefing indicating that Al Shabaab was actively targeting a number of towns in North Eastern Province including Lafey, Arabia, Mandera, Elwak and Burahache. 95 The interlinking dynamics involved in radicalization occurring between Kenya and Somalia shows the connection Kenya has to terrorism either through attacks on Kenyan soil either by Somali militias or by a mix of Kenyans, Somalis and probably other foreigners training in either of the two countries.

There have been several cases of foreign nationals being arrested for terror-related crimes in Kenya. Many of them do not get convicted to partly to an unreliable judicial system. The

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93 Nicholas Kamwende, Head of Anti-Terror Police, as reported in The East African Standard, Kenyan Newspaper, on 25 April 2011
94 Medhane, T, (April 2011), p.9
95 Ombati, C, July 19th, 2012, Standard Newspaper online
main challenge however is the complexity of proving that those arrested are terrorists as they operate in highly secret networks. They may operate within seemingly legal channels of business or religious nature while actually covering up for other activities. A 28 year old British National, Jermain Grant became the center of attention when he was arrested in Mombasa at the Coast province in December 2011. He was accused of being in possession of illegal explosive-making material and plotting to explode a bomb. Yet another 28 year old London man confessed that he had been fundraising for terrorist activity and claimed that by the time of arrest, he had already remitted up to 9,000GBP for terrorist activity including training of recruits to East Africa. Similarly, a 29 year old Chicago man was arrested and pleaded guilty for plotting suicide bombings outside the US and the Federal Bureau of Investigations later confirmed that he had planned to attend a Somali training camp to become a suicide bomber for Al Shabaab. Two teenagers from Cardiff in the UK were deported from Kenya after arrests for having links with terrorist organizations and after this, Muslims in the UK as caught in BBC podcasts admitted to being aware that young people were being lured by extremist groups within their mosques.

While the strength of Al Shabaab has appeared to be waning since the Kenyan Army invaded Somalia in October 2011, the scale of their remaining operations may not be easily quantifiable. The support that the group received from supporters around the globe and some of the declaration its supporters have made serve as caution that the battle might be far from over. One of Al Shabaab leaders declared his loyalty to Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in 2008 and later, the current Al Qaeda’s leader, AL Zawahiri released a propaganda video praising the “Lions of Islam in Somalia”. In 2010, Al Shabaab declared that it intended to connect the Horn of Africa Jihad to the one led by Al Qaeda. These linkages and use of ideology reflect findings from the previous chapter that looked into political Islam. Ideology and the practice of Umma or “togetherness” creates a sense of belonging and can survive long after the existence of militant groups. In this sense, the defeat of Al Shabaab may not mean that the ideology behind it has been defeated. Instead it is possible that it could lead to the rise of deadlier terrorist groups provided that the conditions favoring their existence continue to prevail.

96 Casciani, D, 29th February 2010, BBC Africa News online
97 BBC online News, 5th August 2010
98 Fox News Online, July 12th 2012
99 BBC podcast, Deported men, 18, back in Kenya from the UK, 19th October 2011
100 Royal United Services Institute, April 2012, p.1
In the beginning, Al Shabaab was believed to rely on local Somali manpower for recruits but with time, it evolved and refined itself so that it was drawing from Somali Diaspora and also from neighboring countries particularly Kenya together with other foreign nationals. Kenyans that are not necessarily of Somali or Muslim background are also vulnerable to recruitment into Al Shabaab and other terrorist networks. A Kenyan security firm was recently captured in the media following reports that the personnel recruited were being handed over to Al Shabaab for training. Similarly, two young men were arrested in Kenya’s North Rift, an area not among those highlighted as vulnerable in this study, with possession of hand grenades. This reality indicates that radicalization in Kenya does not pose threat in only the Muslim dominated areas but has the danger of permeating deeper into other parts of the Kenyan society. The situation is made worse as support and funding for terrorist activity has been seen to come from outside the country and the Kenyan society is one that still relishes from the belief that foreign donations are a sure channel towards quick wealth.

In other cases, 7 of the 14 arrested in connection with the bombings that took place in Kampala during the World Cup Match in 2010 were found to be Kenyans. While this is not to say that they were guilty of the crime of terrorism, it indicates that intelligence services are able to detect some secret activities that link a section of Kenyans with terrorist activities. Many have been acquitted “for lack of evidence” to link them with terrorist groups, but few have been convicted and ended up in prison. A number of those convicted have pleaded guilty, a situation that should be handled with caution going by growing concerns on radicalization in prisons. The US, UK and Danish policy makers have recognized the risk of growing levels of radicalization in prisons in recent years.

More work is required to investigate the occurrence of radicalization within Kenyan prisons. Such a study should preferably be carried out before application of any foreign adopted counter-radicalization strategies are applied in the country if indeed such radicalization is found to be prevalent. The purpose of this study is to propose prior investigation on the manifestation of radicalization in Kenya so as to employ the best suited strategies to cope with it. Radicalization in prisons is a high possibility but the prison structures and conditions

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101 Shin, D, 2011, p.209
102 Ombati, C, July 24th 2012, Standard Newspaper Online
103 Obare, O, July 23rd, Standard Newspaper Online
in Kenya do not identify with those of countries that fund counter-terrorism efforts in the country. Strategies employed by funding nations may have a greater impact if the possibilities of radicalization within Kenyan prisons are first understood and the dynamics surrounding it well understood.

In addition to this, the role of youth especially in Muslim communities also needs to be addressed. The social economic status of these societies translate into a pool of unemployed hence bored, idle and thrill seeking youth. These factors coupled with feelings of marginalization and frustrated expectations as a result of diminishing opportunities set the ground for terrorist networks to seek recruits.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{105} Ploch, L, (Nov, 2010), p.16
Radicalization and Counter-terrorism in Kenya

Introduction

In an effort to support the US led war on terror or to forestall the possibility of a war against some of its member states, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) met in October 2001 and collectively condemned terrorism. Since then a consensus has evolved that terrorism constitutes a common security threat that requires cooperative action. Conflict, Early Warning, and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), an organ of IGAD was created in 1992 with the mandate to facilitate the sharing of information on potential conflict areas.

Counterterrorism strategies have been influenced by the apparent success from the end of the Second World War where the US helped to win the war and destroy fascist powers. This development has been the reference point for many leaders in western countries. But due to lack of significant military structures, terrorist groups evade the State’s military apparatus and seek to pull it (the state) deeper into an unwinnable, irregular war. Repression itself however seldom ends terrorism because terrorist groups resort to strategies designed to turn a state’s strength against itself hence being faced with the risk of undermining its legitimacy. These constraints call for states to adopt long term efforts that will remove the enabling environment which enable people to become easy prey of spoilers for violence of whatever nature. Counter-radicalization efforts are geared towards removing the root causes of terrorist activity and support.

Understanding radicalization in the region will inform the dynamics and sensitivities that should be considered while designing an effective counter-radicalisation strategy suitable for the region. The thinking behind a preventative strategy in counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation is based on the ‘hearts and mind’ approach which proposes that the population

107 Juma, M, (2007), p.64
is enticed for support by ensuring that it needs are well understood and social economic conditions are improved.\textsuperscript{110} Studies have gone further using a comparative approach which reveals that ‘hearts and minds’ approach is actually superior to what they call a direct military response in successfully quelling insurgencies.\textsuperscript{111} Following Britain’s experience in Malaya, General Templar was credited for pioneering a counter-insurgency that would succeed against the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). After 9 years (from 1948 to 1957), British colonialists quelled one of political history’s strongest insurgencies. Their success is attributed to a counter insurgency program that shifted focus from military force to intelligence gathering and provision of services.\textsuperscript{112}

Perhaps reliving their earlier experiences and hoping to succeed, the strategy \textit{Contest} was born as a state initiative to fight terrorism in the UK. \textit{Contest} has four strands that enable it to deal with the threat of terrorists in its various stages. \textit{Prevent} is a strand of the \textit{Contest} Strategy which also conducts programs code-named \textit{Pursue}, \textit{Protect} and \textit{Prepare}. \textit{Prevent} focuses on prevailing terrorist threats before they arrive, acting largely on the perceived threat from Islamic radicals.\textsuperscript{113} One of the aims of the \textit{Prevent} strategy in the UK is to employ it abroad as the view is that it will not work while being employed inside the UK alone because radicalization is viewed as having outside connection.\textsuperscript{114}

Through the Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN), the Horn of Africa has made attempts in adopting some form of Counter-radicalisation on a small scale. CEWARN was established by IGAD to provide timely interventions and prevention escalation of violent conflict in the region. In Kenya, the National Steering Committee on Peace building and Conflict Management (NSC) is an agency created in 2001 as an arm that cuts across the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Internal Security. One of NCS’s mandates is outlined as “To facilitate establishment of early warning mechanisms.” In its report, “Consolidating Early Warning and Early Response Capacity in Kenya towards 2012 and Beyond” The Early Warning and Early Response Technical Secretariat clearly recognises that anticipation of conflicts and putting in place effective preventative responses should replace reactionary interventions to conflict. These platforms on both regional and national levels provides an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Duyvesteyn, I, (2011), p.445
\item \textsuperscript{111} Findley, M.G and Young, J.K (2007)
\item \textsuperscript{112} Berman, E, (2009), p.200
\item \textsuperscript{113} Stevens, D, (2011), p.166
\item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{Prevent} strategy, p. 7
\end{itemize}
opportunity through which Kenya can develop preventative programs that can serve as counter-radicalization measures in the struggle against terrorist activity.

**Countering Radicalization in Kenya**

Most terrorist organizations in Africa are associated with Islamic fundamentalism and bear the desire to impose *sharia* law, to get rid of western culture and create a Caliphate in the Horn of Africa as it did in the ancient days.¹¹⁵ The survival of terrorists depends upon the existence of either popular or passive support or both from a surrounding population. Active support will usually include actions such as, hiding members, raising money, providing other sustenance, and especially, joining the organisation. The more diffuse passive support includes actions such as, ignoring obvious signs of terrorist group activity, declining to cooperate with police investigations, sending money to organisations that act as smaller versions of the group, and expressing support for the group’s objectives.¹¹⁶

Kenya has for a long time feared that the Somali-dominated North Eastern province could become a breeding ground for rising Islamism by spilling over radicalization from Somalia. Years of under-development and marginalization by successive Kenyan governments have made the country particularly vulnerable. Saudi based charities that seek to address the grievances of the sidelined Muslim communities could succeed in luring them into radical ideology through well organized Salafist groups.¹¹⁷ Attacks have been carried out in the country, with some locals being arrested in connection with terrorist networks across the globe. The attacks on Kenya and Tanzania’s US embassies in 1998 notwithstanding, the country has faced other attacks such as the Paradise Hotel and Israeli commercial Jet in Coast Province in 2002. Other major attacks on an Israeli Plane with 264 Israel tourists and another on the new US embassy in Nairobi Gigiri area in 2003 were unveiled before they could succeed.¹¹⁸ Other smaller scale attacks have continued to take place in Kenya especially after the Kenya military’s invasion into Somalia following repeated kidnappings of tourists from Kenya.

¹¹⁵ Friedman, R.L, (2009), p. 366
¹¹⁷ Gebrewold, B (2009), p.201
¹¹⁸ Okumu, M, (2007), p.79
After the attack on the US by Al Qaeda in 2001, countries in the Horn of Africa joined forces to fight alongside the US against terrorism. Unfortunately the war on terror became invariably a war on Islam and Muslims, in what has put the Kenyan Muslim community under suspicion, surveillance, harassment, detention and fears of extraordinary rendition since then. The actions of the Kenyan government with advice from the US led to the scrutiny and subsequent closure of some Civil Society Organizations working as charities to provide services to the poor in Muslim communities.\footnote{Ayinde, O.A, (2010), p.54} These charities were said to provide services such as sinking of boreholes to provide water, provision of free meals during the holy month of Ramadan to the poor, and construction of hospitals in places where government facilities did not exist.\footnote{Ibid, p.55} Their closure therefore caused suffering to Muslim individuals and communities that could have been the least linked with terrorist networks.

The answer however, does not lie in shutting down charities as this would deprive the people of essential services and arouse more anger and delegitimizing the government. Instead, the government should seek to compete by providing the essential goods and services expected from it in a non-discriminatory way.\footnote{Berman, E (2009), p. 190/191} Further to this, the old fashioned methods of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are no longer sufficient to confront the modern threat of radical religious rebels. Soft targets become hardened once security and enforcement are in place and in that environment, weak rebels may abandon insurgency altogether while strong rebels turn to terrorism and suicide attacks which radical religious organizations have the strength to do today.\footnote{Ibid, p. 196}

It follows then that depriving marginalized communities and individuals of their source of basic needs such as hospitals, education, water and food as provided by the charities may work to incapacitate terrorist networks’ operations. But the downside is that it leaves a whole community of angry, vulnerable people that are easily influenced into supporting terrorist activities either through active participation or passive refusal to share information on suspicious behavior. Many Kenyan Muslims are believed to have developed resentment at their treatment as “second-class” citizens and this helped to fuel some small scale support for Al Qaeda that enable the attacks in 2002 at Mombasa in Coast Province.\footnote{Medhane, T, (April 2011), p.9}
Counter-radicalization is an integral component in counter-terrorism. However, unlike counter-terrorism which seeks to capture terrorists and stop them from carrying out attacks, counter-radicalization “prevents populations from being radicalized through a variety of non coercive means.” Counter-radicalization and recruitment of terrorists in the UK is a mandate of the Prevent strand of the larger Contest strategy. Prevent is dedicated to stopping people from turning to terrorism by dealing with the root causes that provide an environment which motivates them towards being radicalized and recruited. CONTEST is broader than that, described as “the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy which aims to reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.” Unlike counterterrorism, counter-radicalization does not target terrorists and instead focuses on communities that are easy targets for terrorists for recruitment. This is based on earlier findings that radicalization involves steps and stages that provide an opportunity for policy makers to reverse or stop the process.

Denmark, another of Kenya’s biggest supporters for counter-terrorism efforts has also recognized that prevention or reduction of radicalization is an integral part of the Danish government’s counterterrorism response. Danish efforts are built around the goals of tackling extremist and non-democratic groups and also delimiting potential breeding grounds for terrorists.

This knowledge provides the need to examine counter-terrorism strategies in order to understand how incorporating counter-radicalization efforts can be beneficial in impacting on a community with vulnerabilities towards radicalization. Counter-terrorism efforts in Kenya can be examined from an international perspective, regional, national and community level based on the work of NGOs. The next section attempts to investigate some of the ongoing work in such efforts, with a view to linking the application of counter-radicalization in the strategies applied. The conclusion that follows thereafter will reflect on the findings in this section as well as previous chapters in determining how far Kenya as a country has gone in its understanding of the process of radicalization and promoting this understanding in the counter-terrorism strategies that have been employed in the country.

125 EU Commission Paper, 2008, p.11
126 The definition of CONTEST as provided on its website on the following link; http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-terrorism-strat/
128 Danish Government, May 2012, p.5
Counter-Terrorism efforts in Kenya

Following the terrorist attacks on Kenya’s US embassy in 1998, the country welcomed the OAU Algiers convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in June 1999. But significant work in response to the threat of terrorism was only felt after the US attacks in September 2002. President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya at the time quickly accepted and supported an anti-terrorism bill, The Suppression of Terrorism Bill which was passed in Parliament in 2003. But he was accused of doing this only as a pretext to regaining International aid from the US. Other than this, the Bill became unpopular and was subsequently withdrawn due to its “vague and broad” definition of terrorism and terrorist activities. It was opposed for giving sweeping powers to the police and security forces to arrest, search and detain people without warrants and denial of people their legal right to representation during trials and interrogation.

Before the attacks on the US, earlier terrorist incidents particularly in Kenya and Tanzania were considered isolated cases and failed to receive any significant attention as they did not seriously threaten Western interests. But after terrorist attacks in the US on September 11 2002, the US and other international actors such as Britain and Denmark threw a lot of their weight towards working with nations in the Horn of Africa to eradicate the threat posed by terrorists across the globe. International players have put the Horn of Africa high on their agendas in counterterrorism. Kenya features prominently in International counterterrorism efforts due to its strategic position in the region. The US designated Kenya as “an anchor state” in the Horn of Africa and a “frontline in the Global War on Terror” or GWOT.

Though Kenya has recently been accused of failure to implement tight terrorism and money laundering laws, its vigilance on international terrorists has limited their capacity to operate within its territory. Most recently in 2012, the government has been on the frontline campaigning for an Anti-terrorism bill particularly among the Muslim community in

130 Ayinde, O.A, in Smith, S.M (2010), p.54
133 Medhane, T, (April 2011), p.9
Kenya who are skeptical that it could target them.\textsuperscript{134} This follows after failure by the government to put in place proper anti-terrorism laws following opposition from the public in the years 2003 and 2006. The reasons for this were due to the failure of the US to compensate victims of the 1998 US embassy bombing and also the view that the anti-terrorism bills were only being implemented to satisfy the US.

One of the criticisms of the government’s failure to combat terrorism has been the lack of institutional capacity particularly within its security forces. As such, one of the greatest efforts by the Kenyan government has been to bring its police and military forces up to standards through trainings with international partners such as the US, UK, France and Israel among others. Other measures have involved establishing and equipping anti-terrorism organizations such as the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the Anti Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), the Maritime Interdiction Unit, Joint Terrorism Task force (JTTF) and the Special Prosecution Unit (SPU).\textsuperscript{135} Towards radicalization, the government has expressed its concern over the possibility that its territory could provide a safe haven to terrorists and committed itself towards eradicating this possibility. Efforts for counter-radicalization in Kenya have come from international actors and operated within a regional framework of mechanism. In tackling radicalization, the US has expressed the understanding that underlying social and economic conditions may not correlate directly to increased risk of violent extremism but may indirectly drive and exacerbate cultural and ideological factors that may be exploited by extremist groups. Radicalization among Muslim communities in Kenya particularly has taken place within the “victimization” narrative because the Muslim communities there share in a sense of social, cultural, political and economic exclusion.\textsuperscript{136} Towards this end, the US is concerned in improving attitudes towards it and has therefore engaged in programs that foster opportunities for vulnerable Muslim youth towards employment and positive social interaction. Other programs are focused on the inclusion of minority and marginalized populations that have a geographical inclination particularly along the Kenyan Coast and among ethnic Somalis. There have also been efforts to reach out to the Somali Diaspora community.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{134} Ombati, C, 7\textsuperscript{th} August 2012, Standard Newspaper online, Kenya. Find the link here: http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000063498&pageNo=1
\textsuperscript{135} Mogire, E and Agade, K.M, (2011), p. 476
\textsuperscript{136} Ploch, L, (Nov, 2010), p. 15
\textsuperscript{137} Ploch, L, (Nov, 2010), p. 17
The US after the bombing of its embassy in Nairobi and Tanzania in 1998, responded by implementing counter-terrorism programs in Kenya in a regional and bilateral level. The programs sought to “build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities’ strengthen aviation, port and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies.” In the present time, the US supports its military’s joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and the State Department’s East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI). Additionally, Kenya is currently under pressure from the US to intensify its control over regulation of terrorist financing through enactment of money laundering and terrorist financing laws. Denmark has also been one of the most active countries in providing technical support to Kenya in various counter-terrorism activities. As a part of the Horn of Africa/East African region, Kenya benefits from this partnership through funds aimed at preventing money laundering and counter-radicalization. Activities that come with this funding include training for law officials and reform in the police departments, and building of prisons and also working with civil society organizations towards counter-radicalization work.

International partners to Kenya have engaged in counter-terrorism through the Intergovernmental Authority (IGAD), a building block of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Though challenged for slow capacity building to resolve regional problems and regional conflict, IGAD has been central towards the fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The region made a commitment when it adopted the Draft Implementation Plan to counter terrorism in the region in 2002 and established of the IGAD Capacity Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT) in 2006. The East Africa Community (EAC) has also been a channel through which Kenya addresses terrorism concerns. The EAC’s Regional Defense Counter Terrorism Centre in Nairobi provides a common platform for sharing military intelligence on terrorism.

On a national level, the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NCTC) which was founded in 2003 is Kenya’s multidisciplinary organ charged with the coordination of terrorism efforts in the country. The Ministry of Defense, Kenya Police service, security agencies and Immigration and customs all have staff representing them at the NCTC which carries out

138 Ibid
139 More on this can be read on Daily Nation Newspaper online, August 12th 2012, at: http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-1056/1477868/-/ya9fczx/-/index.html
140 Danish government, May 2012, p. 15
141 Shwartz, M, (February 2012), p. 27
investigative and external reporting roles on terrorism and transnational crimes.\textsuperscript{143} The result of this has been the proscription of 33 groups including Al Shabaab, local groups; \textit{Mungiki}, Baghdad Boys and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) under the Prevention or Organized Crime Act.\textsuperscript{144} Thus Kenya’s counter-terrorism efforts have been mainly focused on a policy formulation capacity but either fails to impact on the lives of the affected or impact on Kenyan Muslims in a negative way. If there is a lesson to be learnt from outside the country in counter-radicalization, it should be through the UK’s counter-radicalization strategy which has partnered with local partners from a broad spectrum in society including schools, universities, health-care providers and prisons.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{143} Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and IGAD Security Sector Reform Program, May 2010, p. 8
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid
\textsuperscript{145} HM Government, July 2011, p.66-71
Chapter Five

Conclusion

Following the analysis in this study, it is tempting to conclude that the understanding conceived of radicalization in Western states is the same understanding that applies in the Horn of Africa. However, a closer look reveals that there are other factors that have been less focused on but which influence the process of radicalization in a different way than has been experienced in the region. Poor governance, weak institutions, corrupt security systems ongoing violence and deteriorating social economic conditions are some of the most prominent factors that continue to provide an enabling environment for individuals to get recruited into terrorist activity. While the spread of ideology has been most successful among the Muslim populations in Kenya and consequently blamed for catalysing recruitment, it must be pointed that Kenyan Muslims have largely demonstrated harmonious co-existence with other religions in the country.

An earlier argument in this study indicated that terrorists do indeed undergo a process of radicalization before they can engage in violent radicalization in the form of terrorist activity. Based on this assertion the involvement of Kenyan Muslims in terrorist activity can be used to explain the occurrence and spread of radicalization. However, the study does not find that internal mobilization has led the Kenyan Muslims to be radicalized. Consequently the most plausible conclusion that would be reached going by this study is that radical Islamist ideology in Kenya is a product of external influence and manipulation. In this sense the ideology of a political Islam agenda has been imported into the country from Muslims in Western nations and the Middle East because Kenya provides an enabling environment. The Coast Province, North Eastern and parts of Nairobi that have shown some terrorist activity have some if not all of the factors that create this kind of environment. A marginalised population of Muslims that feel deprived and alienated from the mainstream structures and administrative functions adds to the permissive environment that enables people to make the decision to join a radical movement.

Strategies that are imported from Western nations should take care not to replicate their own understanding of the process of radicalization as it occurs within their context into the Horn
of Africa. While there is a lot that the country can learn from the experiences of foreign nations in fighting against terrorists, it offers its own unique features that should inform the formulation and effectual undertaking of the strategies applied. A good example is the issue of radicalization within prisons that has taken a significant place in the agenda on counter-terrorism/counter-radicalization efforts in countries such as the US, UK and Denmark which should be picked up as a potential threat in Kenya as well. On the other hand, the factors that do not influence radicalization in the western nations as they do in Kenya cannot be ignored while designing programs to be applied in the country. The Kenyan government through scholars, policy makers, and development, humanitarian and security practitioners should play an active role from the early stages of planning to the point of implementing proposed strategies of counter-radicalization. This will ensure that wholesome and inclusive approaches are adopted and are far reaching to all potentially vulnerable societies in the country.
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