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The African Union Interventionism: Lessons Learnt

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Chapter One

Introduction

Background

Africa’s security challenges have altered since the end of the Cold War, resulting in a dominance of intra-state conflicts. These conflicts have caused significant insecurity not only for the countries in which they play out but for the African continent as a whole. For these reasons, coupled with reluctance on the part of the powers in the Security Council to authorize UN missions in Africa, ostensibly following the Somalia debacle in 1993;¹ the African leaders decided to seek collective mechanisms of tackling these intrastate conflicts. Here, the slogan “African solutions to African problems” gained relevance. Unlike the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that was passive due to its dogmatic interpretation of the principle of non-interference, its successor, the African Union (AU) adopted a “non-indifference” principle, presenting a more interventionist stance.²

Literature points to the fact that civil wars are and have been the leading form of violent conflict in Africa.³ Thus, since 2003, in line with its new principle of “non-indifference,” the AU has authorized the deployment of altogether more than 40,000 peacekeepers into Burundi, the Comoros, Darfur, Somalia, Central Africa, and Mali.⁴

Ultimately, the AU has become a vital tool in the pursuit of peace and security in Africa and thus, AU interventionism is apparently here to stay. Yet, having been launched in 2002, the organization is comparatively young and its experience in peace operations is similarly

¹ Adebajo, (2011).p.233
³ Scott (2012) p.180
⁴ Williams, (October 2011).
undeveloped. Therefore, it is important to analyse AU’s past operations and its evolving role in interventionism so as to identify lessons learnt that would contribute to making the Union better and capable of running future peace operations. Essentially, this is the general objective of this paper.

**Research Question**

The launch of the AU in 2000 represents a ‘paradigmatic shift’\(^5\) in Africa’s peace and security efforts. Since then the AU has engaged in various forms of interventionism.

This progress begs several questions. One, based on the progressive intervention in Burundi, then Sudan and later Somalia; can we claim a distinctly African paradigm or trend of peace operations? How has the AU demonstrated this? Can we similarly identify a model of engagement if not cooperation between the AU and UN in peace operations on the African continent? This will definitely lead us to the main inquiry of the dissertation: what lessons stand out in AU responses to diverse conflict situations in Africa in the last decade? What has been achieved and what are the areas for improvement?

In responding to these questions, this paper identifies lessons learnt so far from AU interventionism, the areas that need improvement and the steps that can be taken to consolidate these positive lessons. It is necessary at this point to explain the purpose of this paper.

**Purpose and Focus**

The purpose of this paper is to examine three cases of AU’s interventionism, which involve the deployment of peace support operations. The objective is to identify both positive and negative lessons learnt from these peace support operations. This includes among others when and how to intervene and the policy implications of AU’s interventionism. The aim is to suggest ways of

\(^5\) Jeng Abou, (2012) p.9
consolidating these positive lessons and achievements so as to improve AU’s capacity in running peace support operations.

Therefore, this paper focuses on a historical and analytical review of AU’s interventionism based on three distinct cases.

The first case is the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003, which represents the foremost peace operation after the formation of the AU in 2002. Next is the United Nations African Mission to Darfur (UNAMID). This is an AU-UN hybrid model. It was established in 2007 to take over from the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Last is the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched in 2007. AMISOM is entirely led by the AU, though the UN and other partners like the European Union provide support.6

These diverse cases also provide lessons on the UN-AU engagement in achieving peace and security in Africa. By examining the evolving role of AU interventionism or peace operations, these past experiences or lessons can guide future UN and other donors’ support for AU capacity building.

**Methodology**

The research design adopted here is a descriptive analysis of secondary data or sources on AU and its interventionism approaches in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia. The choice of the case studies provides examples of various approaches to intervention which enrich the objective of this paper. Other modes of intervention like negotiations and mediation such as those in Kenya and Zimbabwe are briefly analysed so as to enrich the analysis of the AU’s intervention paradigm.

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6 Boutellis and Williams, (2013),p.15
The secondary sources used are books, academic journals, authoritative newspaper reports and internet materials. Also, primary sources such as official documents of the AU and UN such as protocols, speeches, communiqués, resolutions and charters or treaties are used.

**Conceptual framework**

Certainly, debates on intervention always raise questions of sovereignty. Partly because intervention is as ancient instrument of foreign policy as are diplomatic pressure, negotiations and war.\(^7\) Accordingly, there is tension between the realist view of sovereignty which is largely unconditional and the liberal view of sovereignty which is conditional.\(^8\) Interventionism, and this paper takes the latter view, is necessary in certain circumstances that make sovereignty conditional. As Brownlie suggests, a state that cruelly treats its subjects will have abused its sovereignty and should be regarded as having made itself liable to intervention.\(^9\)

This paper does not embrace the realist position because it is not suitable for analysing Africa’s contemporary security dynamics.\(^10\) One reason is that in Africa the distinction between “states” and “non-states” is almost unnoticeable.\(^11\) It is these African state weaknesses that have also made it prone to civil wars.

So, questions have been raised over non-interference and non-indifference in the wake of civil wars. One such question is how should intergovernmental organisations such as the AU respond when the security of citizens is threatened not by other states but by their own governments? Africa responded by providing for intervention in another state in respect of “war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”\(^12\)

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\(^7\) Morgenthau, *Foreign Affairs*  
\(^8\) Graham, and Newnham, (1998), p.279-289  
\(^9\) Brownlie,(1963), p.338  
\(^12\) AU Constitutive Act, (2000), Article 4(h)
Still, intervention is a broad concept and encompasses various aims and means. This is why conditional sovereignty implies that aims and means have been developed which allow relevant actors to circumvent the principle of sovereignty and its corollary non-interference. This paper identifies some of the aims such as humanitarian intervention; human security and responsibility to protect that have become necessary in justifying intervention. With regard to means, the paper identifies peace support operations such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking and peace building.

To begin with, humanitarian intervention is defined as;

“coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its government, with or without authorization from the UN Security Council, for the purpose of preventing or putting to halt gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.”\(^{13}\)

This agrees with Bull’s classical definition of humanitarian intervention as “dictatorial or coercive interference to prevent crimes against humanity and genocide.”\(^{14}\) But, reservations about militarization of humanitarian aid by the use of the word “humanitarian” in cases of coercive or military intervention, has sustained controversy over the use of the term “humanitarian intervention.”\(^ {15}\)

Next, the concept “Responsibility to Protect” or R2P, refers to the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens, but when the states are unwilling or unable, then international society bears a collective responsibility to protect people and can override the sovereignty of the state in question.\(^ {16}\) This definitely is conditional sovereignty.

The idea of human security presupposes that human and not state security is important. This responds to the question about what can be done when populations are threatened by own

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\(^{13}\) Danish Institute of International Affairs, (1999)

\(^{14}\) See, Bull (ed), (1984)

\(^{15}\) Kioko, (2003), p.809

governments. Basically, this implies that states can be causes of insecurity to citizens they are supposed to protect. In such a case intervention becomes necessary.

Crucial to this paper are the means of circumventing sovereignty and therefore implementing interventionism. These include the following terms as used in this paper. Peacemaking is an action to bring conflicting parties to an agreement, primarily through peaceful means as those stated in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{17} For example mediation and negotiation, commonly used by the AU, fall under these peaceful means. While peacekeeping is the deployment of a contingent, “with the consent of all the parties concerned”, usually comprising of military, police and civilian personnel.\textsuperscript{18} Peace enforcement is a third party intervention which uses force to create a cessation in hostilities.\textsuperscript{19} It relies on UN’s Chapter VII which authorizes use of coercion and military force.\textsuperscript{20} Unlike peacekeeping, peace enforcement may proceed without getting consent of parties to the conflict.\textsuperscript{21}

Finally, peacebuilding is defined as action to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict.\textsuperscript{22} In 2007, a new definition was agreed on which currently informs the UN.\textsuperscript{23} This definition goes further to capture the liberal peacebuilding aspects such as “strengthening national capacities” and laying the “foundations for sustainable peace and development.” But interesting, the definition seeks to rectify the notion of “neo-liberal peacebuilding templates” by further stating that,

“Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{17} An Agenda for Peace: (1992), para.,20
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid
\textsuperscript{19} See Heldt and Wallensteen, (2005)
\textsuperscript{20} UN Charter,(1945), Chapter VII
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid
\textsuperscript{22} An Agenda for Peace (1992), para.,55
\textsuperscript{23} UN Peacebuilding Support Office, “What is Peacebuilding?”
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid
\end{footnotesize}
Peacebuilding activities may include DDR and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.\(^{25}\)

This paper uses the terms “peace support operations” (PSOs) to refer to AU missions and “peace operations” for UN missions.\(^{26}\) In this paper, the two terms mean the same thing and are used interchangeably. Accordingly, this paper adopts Williams’ definition of peace operations as:

> “involving the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military), with a mandate to: assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process, serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements, and enforce ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace.”\(^{27}\)

Further, this paper adopts the term ‘peace (support) operations’ and not peacekeeping because many of the AU’s contemporary missions cannot be adequately captured by the term ‘peacekeeping;’ since they are often deployed in situations where a peace agreement or ceasefire does not exist.\(^{28}\) These forces seek to establish peace before keeping it. In the discussions of this paper, peace support operations encompass peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace-building activities.

So, interventionism here means the deployment of peace support operations. This paper adopts the definition that interventionism is responding to violent humanitarian catastrophe occurring in the territory of sovereign states.\(^{29}\) The paper does not characterise the AU interventionism as “dictatorial or coercive interference”\(^{30}\) hence legitimate authorisation or consent is crucial. This is because the AU interventionism, though based on the concept of conditional sovereignty such as genocide, rarely employs coercive mechanism as it is often based on consent.

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\(^{25}\) *An Agenda for Peace*, (1992), para.,20

\(^{26}\) Boutellis and Williams, (2013), footnotes, p.1

\(^{27}\) Williams, (July 2013),p.2


\(^{29}\) Crocker, Osler and Aall, (2011), p.7

\(^{30}\) See, Bull(ed), (1984)
Thus, in the discourse of the AU interventionism, consent means that a host state through a government or any existing authority either invites or accepts intervention. However, consent by invitation is often open to abuse.\textsuperscript{31} In civil wars governments are frequently party to the conflict and they may invite friendly states to intervene as a way of repressing genuine opposition or grievances. While some states may be strong and deny or give limited consent making the intervention difficult, others may be weak or lack a central government, necessary for issuing invitation or consent. For example, in Somalia, the transition government only controlled a small part of the country as insurgents controlled the rest. But intervention by actors including the UN and the AU was done on the side of this government. Actually, to clearly specify the objectives of intervention given the vested interest of states is doubtful. Therefore, legitimate intervention should be done collectively through international organisations and not individual states.

This paper mainly analyses the security aspects of the peace operations, while the political processes like mediation and peacebuilding agendas, are briefly discussed as a way of linking the activities of the AU and UN as well as highlighting the role of peace agreements in peace operations.

**AU Interventionism in Perspective**

The evolution of the AU interventionism invites a comparison with its predecessor the OAU. On 25 May 1963 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was launched. Among its purposes was to defend and respect independence of states, and liberate those still under colonialism.\textsuperscript{32} Here, it can be deduced that with South Africa being the last country to be fully liberated, one of OAU’s key purposes had been fulfilled rendering the organization due for change.

\textsuperscript{31} Wood, (2007), p.2
\textsuperscript{32} OAU Charter, (1963) Article 11
Relevant OAU principles are sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.\textsuperscript{33} As such, the OAU Charter centred on non-interference and by so doing it emphasised the protection of the state rather than the individual.\textsuperscript{34} This permitted Africa’s dictators to oppress their own people.\textsuperscript{35} For example, Uganda’s President Idi Amin committed atrocities against Ugandans but was still embraced in the OAU meetings, at one time becoming its chair in 1975.\textsuperscript{36}

Even with the high incidence of intrastate conflicts in Africa, the OAU still remained unresponsive due to its strict interpretation of the non-interference principle. Thus, transition from non-interference to non-indifference was crucial. Mainly because, as the former AU Chair Mbeki observed, the challenges that the continent now suffers surpass the original, political mandate of the OAU.\textsuperscript{37}

Accordingly, the transition from OAU to AU was a reform process that led to a strong provision for AU interventionism in member states.\textsuperscript{38} This was also after a realization by African leaders of the growing marginalization of the continent reflected in the inactivity of the international Community during the 1994 Rwanda genocide.\textsuperscript{39} Similarly, following the 1993 Somalia intervention where American troops were killed, the US issued a May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25, declaring its future non-participation in African peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{40}

Overall, the willingness of world powers to intervene in African conflicts became doubtful.\textsuperscript{41} Africa had to look after itself; a resolve expressed in the slogan “African solutions to African problems.” Consequently, the AU was launched with an express provision for intervention in a

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, Article III
\textsuperscript{34} Murray, (2004), pp. 7-8
\textsuperscript{35} Murithi, (2009), p.94
\textsuperscript{36} Welch Jr., (1991), p. 536
\textsuperscript{37} Thabo Mbeki, (25 May 2003)
\textsuperscript{38} Adejumobi and Olukoshi in Adejumobi and Olukoshi,(eds), (2009), p.7
\textsuperscript{39} Adebajo, (2011).p.xvii
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid
\textsuperscript{41} Amoo, (1993),p.256
Member state. This became the hallmark of African interventionism. Accompanying this legal provision are structures and institutions that are meant to bolster the AU interventionism.

**Structure and institutions of the AU**

Pertinent to interventionism are two organs or institutions of the AU. First is the AU Commission (AUC), which handles daily peace and security issues and plays a similar role to the UN Secretariat.\(^{42}\) Within the AUC is the Department of Peace and Security (DPS) which comprises the Conflict Management Division (CMD), Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), the Peace and Security Secretariat and the Defence and Security Division (DSD).\(^{43}\) Collectively the DPS is the institutional body directly charged with achieving the AU’s goal of peace and security in Africa.\(^{44}\)

The other institution is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2004.\(^ {45}\) It is AU’s standing decision-making body for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.\(^ {46}\) It has fifteen elected members and unlike in the UN Security Council, there are no permanent members and no veto in PSC.\(^ {47}\) Notably, the PSC with the AUC is empowered to authorize the deployment of peace support missions; approve intervention modalities and recommend intervention by the AU in a Member State.\(^ {48}\) This places PSC at the heart of AU interventionism.

Supporting the PSC as parts of the APSA are the AUC, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force (to be operationalised by 2014) and a Special Fund. Hence, under APSA, the AU has intervention tools for peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.\(^ {49}\)

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\(^{42}\) Ibid, Article 20(1)

\(^{43}\) The AU Commission

\(^{44}\) Hull and Svensson, (2008),p.13


\(^{46}\) Ibid, Article 2

\(^{47}\) AU: Peace and Security Council

\(^{48}\) Ibid, Article 7

\(^{49}\) Murithi, (2009, p.92
Even so, a major drawback to AU’s effectiveness in interventionism is weak organisational, logistical and financial capabilities.\textsuperscript{50} Hence, AU interventionism largely continues to depend on the resource support from the UN, EU and bilateral donors like US and UK.

The UN has a ten-year capacity building programme for the AU (2006-2016) and has established the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU).\textsuperscript{51} The EU established the African Peace Facility (APF) as a financial instrument to fund AU-led peace support operations and capacity-building activities.\textsuperscript{52} Moreover, states like US and UK give bilateral support to AU interventions. For example the UK established the Africa conflict prevention Pool (ACPP) in 2001 to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Africa.\textsuperscript{53} The ACPP brings together various UK institutions such as Department for International Development (DFID).\textsuperscript{54}

**The structure of the Paper**

This paper is structured around two main themes: The AU interventionism practices in the last decade, and the lessons learnt so far. Succeeding the introduction are four chapters which examine various issues that highlight these two themes.

Chapter 2 analyses the case of Burundi where AMIB was the first ever AU intervention. The objective is to identify the negative and positive lessons learnt at this earliest stage of AU’s interventionism. Chapter 3 looks at the Darfur conflict where the AU operated alongside the UN in a ‘hybrid’ operation called UNAMID. There are lessons learnt here both for the AU and the UN, on their collaboration in tackling complex emergencies. The AU’s intervention in Somalia is the subject of Chapter 4. AMISOM is an interesting case since it reveals relative success on the part of the AU in a situation where central government and state authority are weak or collapsed. It also shows how international partners can work through the AU. Finally, the last

\textsuperscript{50} Boutellis and Williams, (2013),p.1  
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, (2013),p.14  
\textsuperscript{52} Pirozzi, (2009), p.25  
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, p.23  
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, p.24
chapter is a reflection on the whole thesis by way of a conclusion. It is here that the overall lessons learnt, and the way forward, are highlighted.
Chapter Two

The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB): Lessons from the First AU Intervention

Background

The preceding chapter discussed the evolution from non-interference to non-indifference. The AU’s principle of non-indifference supported by the theme of “African solutions to African problems” was put to test in Burundi.

The choice of AMIB is motivated by two factors. Foremost, AMIB was the first operation entirely initiated, planned and implement by AU member states.55 Second, through AMIB, the AU had an opportunity to invoke Article 4(h) which provides for intervention in a member state. As Powell affirms, AMIB gave the AU an opportunity to demonstrate a break from the OAU and take on the role of delivering on peace and security issues in Africa.”56

Hence, the general inquiry is what lessons were learnt during AU’s first and “infant” interventionism?

56 Powell, (2005), p.35
Burundi: operationalising AU interventionism

Burundi’s population is nominally comprised of the Hutu 85%, the Tutsi 14% and the Twa (Pygmy) 1%. This demographic profile corroborates the observation that Burundi’s conflicts revolve around manipulation of ethnicity between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority.

Since independence, the Tutsi minority dominated key power institutions; namely the Burundi Armed forces and the Government. This resulted in a series of Hutu rebellions which were countered by Tutsi repressions. These developed into a “cycle of violence” captured in three periods in the post-colonial Burundi. They include the 1972 genocide, 1998 ethnic tensions and the violence that ensued after the 1993 multiparty democratisation processes. In 1972, the Hutu rebelled in the South of Burundi killing many Tutsis. In response, the Tutsi dominated government massacred an estimated 200,000 Hutus. Further, in 1998 ethnic violence erupted in the North with a number of Tutsis being killed. Here, again the Tutsi-led government responded violently killing an estimated number of 20,000 Hutus.

Finally, in June 1993 elections a predominantly Hutu political party, Front pour la Democratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) emerged victorious; ushering the country’s first democratically elected president Melchior Ndadaye. Unfortunately, in October 1993, president Ndadaye was assassinated ostensibly by Tutsi soldiers. This triggered the twelve-year civil war which claimed the lives of over 300,000 people and displaced thousands. This explosion of violence also became a challenge to the Great Lakes region. Neighbouring countries such as Tanzania which bore the brunt of refugee influxes, decided to respond.

57 Burundi Demographics Profile 2013
58 Eller,(2002),p.211
60 Ibid
63 Ibid
External response: The Peace process

In 1996, peace negotiations began with Tanzania’s president Julius Nyerere as the chief mediator. This was part of the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi. Negotiations mainly took place between Hutu dominated FRODEBU and Tutsi-dominated Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) as the main parties.\textsuperscript{65} After Nyerere’s death in October 1999, South Africa’s retired president Nelson Mandela took over as mediator. Following numerous summits, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed in August 2000.\textsuperscript{66} However, there was no comprehensive ceasefire because two splinter groups, Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie-Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (CCDD-FDD) of Pierre Nkurunziza and Agathon Rwasa’s PALIPEHUTU-Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL) continued fighting.

Later, the Arusha Agreement was bolstered by two agreements. The first one on 7 October 2002 was signed between the Transition Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Burundi Armed Political Parties Movement (APPM).\textsuperscript{67} Later, another agreement was signed on 2 December 2002 between the TGoB and CNDD-FDD.\textsuperscript{68} The PALIPEHUTU-FNL boycotted these peace processes and continued waging war.\textsuperscript{69}

Relating to the Arusha Agreement and the other ceasefire agreements, two observations are made. One, the Agreement was signed at a time when OAU was being transformed into the AU. AMIB was actually initiated and mandated in 2003 by the remaining organ of OAU, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR), before AU’s PSC was inaugurated in 2004.\textsuperscript{70} Two, these Agreements revealed the then reluctance of the UN to intervene in the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. Particularly, despite

\textsuperscript{65} Adebajo, (2011),p.75
\textsuperscript{66} Agoagye, ( 2004), p.9
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid
\textsuperscript{69} Adebajo, (2011),p.77
\textsuperscript{70} Svensson, (2008),p.10
recognition by Africa that the UN had primary responsibility for international peace and security, the UN remained reluctant to intervene in the Burundi crisis.

The first Arusha Agreement envisaged a request for a UN peacekeeping force to monitor implementation of the ceasefire agreement but fighting delayed it. The second ceasefire agreement of October 2002 with smaller Burundi Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs) placed the task of verification and control of the ceasefire on a UN or AU mission. Later, the ceasefire agreement of December 2002 with the CNDD-FDD placed verification and control of the ceasefire agreement under an African Mission. This is partly because the UN rejected the terms of this last agreement and due to persisting violence. The new organization therefore had to intervene. It is against this backdrop that AMIB was created and deployed in April 2003.

**AMIB: structure and operations**

Structurally, AMIB consisted of military and civilian components totalling to about 3 335, with military contingents from South Africa (1 600), Ethiopia (858) and Mozambique (228), and the AU observer element (43) drawn from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia. Heading the Mission was a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission.

Operationally, AMIB’s objectives included: overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire agreements; supporting DDR, and ensuring creation of conditions for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission. Its tasks were to act as liaison between the parties and provide VIP

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72 Agoagye,(2004).p.9
73 Ceasefire Agreement, (December 2002), Article III
74 Svensson, (2008),p.11
75 Agoagye, (2004).p.11
76 See The Ninety-first Ordinary Session of the Central Organ, (2 April 2003), p.2
protection for designated returning leaders.\textsuperscript{77} This implied that AMIB’s intervention went beyond peacekeeping to encompass peace-building activities.

The Central Organ of OAU, which authorised AMIB, directed that South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) and the AU Military observers already on the ground be subsequently incorporated into the African Mission.\textsuperscript{78} The SAPSD had been deployed in October 2000 primarily to protect designated returning leaders, especially Hutu leaders, returning to Burundi to participate in the peace process.\textsuperscript{79} Afterwards it was easier and quick for South Africa to raise its troops from 700 to 1600 under AMIB.\textsuperscript{80} Other countries that had pledged troops such as Ethiopia and Mozambique delayed till October 2003 due to a lack of adequate funding,\textsuperscript{81} which was compounded by the AU provision requiring states to deploy by self-sustaining mechanism for the initial 60 days.\textsuperscript{82} Hence, the US and Britain supported Ethiopian and Mozambican to deploy troops.\textsuperscript{83}

The operational concept of AMIB can be clustered into three strategic components.\textsuperscript{84} The first is the component on DDR which was allocated to SA and Ethiopian contingents with the task of establishing two demobilisation centres at Bubanza and Buhinga provinces respectively.\textsuperscript{85} However, DDR activities require more resources and personnel;\textsuperscript{86} this presented a big challenge to the AU Mission.

Overall, it was projected that AMIB would disarm an estimated total of 20 000 ex-combatants from various demobilisation centres.\textsuperscript{87} Although, AMIB successfully established Cantonment

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} Ibid, p.2-3
\item \textsuperscript{78} Ibid, p.3
\item \textsuperscript{79} Agoagye, (2004),p.10
\item \textsuperscript{80} Ibid, p.11
\item \textsuperscript{81} Jeng, (2012) p.222
\item \textsuperscript{82} The Ninety-first Ordinary Session of the Central Organ (2003) p.3
\item \textsuperscript{83} Adebayo, (2011),p.76
\item \textsuperscript{84} Jeng (2012),pp 222-225
\item \textsuperscript{85} Ibid, p.222
\item \textsuperscript{86} Berdal,(1996) 39-58:39
\item \textsuperscript{87} Agoagye, (2004),p.11
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Site 1 at Bubanza on 25 May 2003, it was only able to canton 200 ex-combatants a month later.\(^88\) Regardless, running this Cantonment required that substantial resources be availed to sustain the ex-combatants. However, AMIB had resource limitations and struggled to provide food, infrastructure and medical supplies to its own troops.\(^89\) Therefore, AMIB mobilised resources mainly from the EU, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) (now GIZ), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Health Organisation (WHO). The EU started financing the food supplies to the Cantonment in August 2003.\(^90\)

Elsewhere, AMIB was able to repel an attack on the Cantonment with an estimated eight casualties on the part of attackers.\(^91\) This sent a stern message to the armed groups that AMIB was not to be underrated; indeed no such attack occurred again.\(^92\) AMIB also identified 11 Pre-disarmament Assembly Areas (PDAAs) where ex-combatants gathered at Muyange were moved to in December 2003 and January 2004.\(^93\)

The second strategic component of AMIB’s operations was the provision of security to facilitate the implementation of the peace process. The Mozambican contingent provided escorts for sustainment convoys and all other movements, including those of humanitarian NGOs, while the special Protection and Reaction Unit (SPU) of South Africans provided protection to the returned leaders.\(^94\)

AMIB’s conduct of the security objective can be discerned in two functions. First is the provision of security for people, groups, officials and institutions involved in the actual realisation of the peace process. Here, key success was that AMIB committed significant resources to ensure the safe arrival of CNDD–FDD’s movement members in Burundi and

\(^{88}\) Ibid
\(^{89}\) Svensson, (2008), p.14
\(^{90}\) Boshoff and Vrey, (2006), p.25
\(^{92}\) Boshoff and Vrey, (2006), p.26
\(^{93}\) Svensson, (2008), p.14
\(^{94}\) Agoagye, (2004).p.11
allowed the movement to formally take part in the peace process. The second function was the security provided to facilitate humanitarian activities such as the return of refugees and internally displaced people and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Overall, security was the most prominent task of AMIB especially the protection of the returned leaders by the SPU. By and large, AMIB’s supervision of the implementation of the ceasefire agreements was successful.

The third strategic component is the initiation and engagement in peacebuilding as part of a long healing process. Important here is the inclusionary engagement that involved non-state actors such as indigenous social institutions. Some argue that the collaborative approaches of AMIB which saw the involvement of the traditional institution of Bashingantahe, which helped to mobilise elders, and the inclusion of most parties to the conflict, “were credited for the stabilization of about 95 per cent of Burundi.” Here, the mission’s initiatives apparently departed from common neo-liberal “template” solutions and engaged a bottom-up approach that was particularly useful in the implementation of the peace agreement.

**Capacity: Logistics and funding**

From the onset AMIB faced problems of under-funding, limited personnel and limited equipment. Thus, one mitigating strategy was the ‘concept of self-sustainment’, where countries deploy and sustain troops using their own resources awaiting reimbursement after 90 days. But, these states were also struggling with own financial challenges.

Further, the overall budget for AMIB’s deployment, operations and sustainment was projected at about US $110 million; however, at the end of its mandate, the mission cost US $134 million.

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95 Boshoff and Vrey, (2006),p.32  
97 Rodt, (2011), p.11  
98 Jeng, (2012) p.223-225  
99 Agoagye,(2004),p.14  
100 The Ninety-first Ordinary Session of the Central Organ ( 2003) p,4  
This was more than one third of the entire AU Commission budget for 2003. Unfortunately, even the pledges by traditional donors fell far short of the budget since only $50 million were pledged to the AU trust fund, worse still; it only received an estimated $10 million. Therefore, the AU could hardly sustain its own troops, let alone maintenance of the ex-combatants undergoing the DDR process. Hence, the EU helped by funding food, medicine and other supplies for the cantonment areas.

The UN assistance to AMIB included technical support from the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to enhance AMIB’s capacity in the areas of public information, headquarters administration and DDR. As such, the role of MONUC indicated that the peace process in Burundi was started as part of the Great Lakes Peace Initiative.

Remarkably, the transition from AMIB to the UN mission (ONUB) went as scheduled. A UN evaluation team in February 2004 concluded that the conditions were appropriate for a UN deployment. AMIB had established relative peace to most provinces in Burundi, except the region outside Bujumbura where FNL sustained an armed resistance. Moreover, the transition to UN mission was facilitated by the “re-hatting” of 2612 AMIB troops to form the first contingent of the UN force.

The AMIB experience marked the beginning of an informal trend where the AU intervenes to bridge the gap between the eruption of violent conflict and the UN peacekeeping response.

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103 Agoagye,(2004),p.13
104 Boshoff and Very, (2006), p.25
106 Ibid
109 Rodt, (2011),p.21
Lessons Learnt

The first lesson is about the role of a lead nation or regional hegemony in the success of AU interventionism. Here, South Africa (SA) played a major role. Besides mediating the peace process, SA deployed the largest number of troops to AMIB. Therefore even though AMIB was an AU mission comprising three main TCCs, it immensely dependent on SA. Hence, the ways of identifying, involving and working with regional powers should be developed by the AU for future interventions. It would be wrong, however, to take this as a replacement of the merits of AU engaging sub-regional organisations (RECs), as both may be needed.

The next vital lesson is that when regional states, who apparently are directly affect by the conflict, work together, the intervention is bound to be successful. The political will of both regional powers and neighbouring states is crucial. The active involvement of neighbouring states through the Regional Initiative for Burundi helped to facilitate the cooperation at the state level which was necessary for AMIB’s success.

This leads us to another key lesson relating to the role of respected senior political figures. The peace process in Burundi was initiated and driven by respected and senior regional leaders like Nyerere and Mandela. These leaders were able to use their good offices to drive the peace process and mobilise international support. The choice of mediators is extremely vital in achieving peace agreements.

This latter point underscores the importance of a peace process in operations. As Williams posits, “the merits of deploying a particular peace operation should be assessed with direct reference to the prospects for constructing a successful peace process.” Therefore, inasmuch as peace operations are about getting a ceasefire, they should also be about addressing the underlying causes of the conflicts. Thus, the existence of the Arusha Peace Agreement was useful in the operations of AMIB. Therefore, resources should equally be channelled towards the peace agreement.

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110 Agoagye, (2004), p.11
112 Williams, (2013), p.6
process as they are for the security or troop operations. That is, the security operation should be accompanied by a political process of negotiations.

Financing of the mission was a major challenge and a lesson to AU interventionism. AMIB had to rely on self-sustaining by TCCs, a factor that delayed troops’ deployment. Even, the DDR programme was slow because of being under-funded. Donors are sceptical about the ability of the AU to efficiently manage and control approved funds. Similarly, given that the AU was still young and undergoing developments in its peace and security architecture, this too influenced the donors’ doubts about AMIB’s capacity. Ironically the AU needs these funds to develop its required capacity.

Further, the AU partners, especially the UN, often overestimate AU’s capabilities based on the AU mandates. This is a key lesson for the AU to match its ambitions to capabilities, especially in their mandates that touch on peacebuilding such as DDR, which need more resources. But, importantly, the AU member states should endeavour to fund the Union’s operations. AMIB revealed the reluctance, low political will and definitely the inability of most AU member states to support African missions on the continent.

Another negative lesson was poor donor coordination. Under the “concept of self-sustaining”, TCCs developed multiple bilateral relations with donors. This in itself made it difficult for the AU to manage the self-sustaining concept, even sometimes leading to double reimbursement. This poorly coordinated system made it difficult to have proper utilization of international support. A better remedy, as suggested, is to have a centralised system managed by the mission Headquarter.

Likewise, one key developing area for coordination, which was also prominent in AMIB, is the growing need for clear working relations between the AU and a complex the nexus of the UN-

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113 Boshoff and Vrey, (2006), p.49
114 Williams, (2013), p.3
115 Svesson, (2008), p.17
EU-U.S. As some form of division of labour emerges between these partners, it is upon the AU to find ways of maximising on this mix of international support by establishing a professional coordination team for its Peace Fund.

Another important lesson emanates from the AU’s experience at Muyange demobilisation centre. When mission forces repel any attacks from armed groups with finality, it makes hostile parties aware that the role of the mission in the country is to be taken seriously. After the Muyange experience, the armed attacks on the mission never recurred. This falls in line with the issues raised by the “Brahimi Report” which called for robust operations that would enable missions to achieve their mandated tasks as well as deter antagonistic parties from using force against peacekeepers and civilians.\(^\text{117}\) Thus, owing to the violent nature of most internal conflicts, the AU should deploy mission which are also fully ready to engage in combat.

Concerning peacebuilding activities, lessons emerged too. Key was the idea of inclusivity. It is suggested that the inclusionary approaches of AMIB, which saw the involvement of the traditional institution, and elders, and the inclusion of most parties to the conflict, led to the stabilization of Burundi.\(^\text{118}\)

The AU interventionism in Burundi pointed to the different philosophies between the AU and UN on interventionism, especially on when and how to intervene. Thus, despite requests through AU declarations, the UN was reluctant to intervene in Burundi, waiting for the AU to create necessary conditions. But, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it.\(^\text{119}\) So, an informal model emerged where the AU intervenes to ensure a ceasefire holds and then the UN comes in to ensure the “peace is kept” and to accompany the country through the transition to peacebuilding.

\(^\text{117}\) Ibid, p.48
\(^\text{118}\) Agoagye, (2004), p.14
Largely, AMIB demonstrates how a relatively small mission, with limited resources but greater political will of regional states, can significantly contribute to both the peace and security of a country, even when other AU member states, the UN and international partners are unable or unwilling to intervene.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed AMIB, especially as it is an important case study for the then newly launched AU. This first attempt at interventionism on peace and security in the continent or ‘African solutions to African problems’ resulted in several positive and negative lessons being learnt. A variety of issues were identified in AMIB, and include aspects such as a lack of funding; technical ability; the role of senior leadership on these intervention processes; coordination across a variety of actors; issues of political will, and a need for inclusivity, in order for interventionism to be successful.

But one innovative model was the “concept of self-sustenance,” also now referred to as the “Burundi model” which involved member states in burden sharing, hence help to manage the capacity problem. Despite its challenges such as TCCs lacking capacity to “self-sustain”, it is still used by AU as a viable model until, probably the ASF is operationalised.

Equally, when regional states invest their full political will for the collective good, and bolstered by a regional power; then peace operations will not only be rapid but will also make significant impact on regulating the conflict.

Also, once a decision to deploy has been made, AU member states and the international partners should maximally support the mission to succeed. This is because the success of a given mission determines AU’s credibility to engage in subsequent interventions.
Numerous challenges notwithstanding, AMIB made a positive impact. It is argued that if AU had not intervened, Burundi would have degenerated into an escalation of violent conflict.\textsuperscript{120} Boutellis and Williams argue that AMIB “demonstrated a willingness and ability of the AU and some of its African member states, to take on peace enforcement mandates.”\textsuperscript{121} Overall, AU’s nascent intervention in Burundi was a milestone in the implementation of the principle of non-indifference.

\textsuperscript{120} Murithi, (2008) pp71-82:75
\textsuperscript{121} Boutellis A, and Williams P, (2013),p.12
Chapter Three

AU’s Hybrid interventionism: the United Nations-African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

Introduction

The 21st Century has seen Africa grapple with violent conflict and rising threat of non-state actors to peace and security.\(^{122}\) However, while the AU has increasingly become a key actor in intervention, its capacity to run peace operations is limited.

Meanwhile, the need for peacekeeping operations and other interventions in conflicts in Africa has surpassed the UN capacity.\(^{123}\) As at 2012, the UN was already overstretched, with approximately 120,000 peacekeepers deployed and a budget of almost US$ 8 billion per year.\(^ {124}\) The point here is that the UN and AU need to work together in tackling African peace and security challenges.

Yet, inasmuch as there is a definite need for a productive burden sharing between the UN and AU, challenges still remain on how best the two organizations can work together.

Hence, this chapter analyses UNAMID often referred to as AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, as a fundamental case that exemplifies some of the positive and negative lessons to be learnt from the AU-UN relations during interventions in Africa.

\(^{122}\) Williams, (2013), p.1


\(^{124}\) Linnéa et al.,(2012)p.8
Is it a case of forced collaboration?

The creation of UNAMID was a consequence of limited options due to particular political and security circumstances.\(^{125}\) These circumstances were manifested in three ways. First, Sudan government under President Omar Al-Bashir opposed the deployment of a UN mission. Earlier, on 31 August 2006 the Security Council authorized the expansion of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) into Darfur region.\(^{126}\) But, Sudan insisted on a mission with a purely African character.\(^{127}\) Second, China which was a key commercial player in Sudan, insisted that Security Council’s resolution meant to replace African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a UN mission, be subjected to the consent of Sudan.\(^{128}\) Obviously, Sudan did not give the consent as it preferred an African mission. Third, in June 2006, an AU-UN joint assessment mission reported that there were potential security threats and negative consequences if a purely UN force was deployed in Darfur.\(^{129}\) Especially, the terror group al-Qaeda, whose leader bin Laden who had lived in Sudan, issued a statement that Darfur was a Muslim territory and UN operations represented global imperialism which was to be fought by all means.\(^{130}\)

Therefore, the transition of AMIS to UNMIS failed. The only option was to create a hybrid mission. So, UNAMID formally replaced AMIS on 1 January 2008.\(^{131}\) Here, it was observed that “For the first time, the UN created an operation for which it assumed full responsibility financially but over which it would not retain exclusive control.”\(^{132}\)

\(^{125}\) Boutellis and Williams, (2013), p.10
\(^{126}\) UN Security Council, (5 June 2007), p.2
\(^{127}\) Boutellis and Williams, (2013) p.12
\(^{129}\) Ibid
\(^{130}\) Murithi, (2008), p.78
\(^{132}\) Ibid
**Intervention: AMIS to UNAMID**

In February 2003, groups under Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebelled against social and economic marginalisation of Darfurians by the ruling regime in Khartoum.\(^{133}\) The government retaliated with a combination of military offensive and a proxy fighting force, today known as the Janjaweed.\(^{134}\) Since then, hundreds of thousands of people have died with over two million displaced from their home.\(^{135}\)

When the conflict broke out in 2003, the AU initiated a mediation process, which culminated into the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) on 8\(^{th}\) April 2004.\(^{136}\) This was followed by the deployment in 2004 of AMIS comprising of a small number of observers to monitor the ceasefire.\(^{137}\) Later, after the collapse of the ceasefire (HFCA), the AU expanded the mandate of AMIS to include protection of civilians and authorised a force of 3320 personnel of which 2341 were military personnel.\(^{138}\) But owing to lack of resources, the AU communicated later that the military component of AMIS would have 597 troops, down from projected 2314.\(^{139}\)

Following a series of joint AU-UN assessment missions to Darfur, resolutions and negotiations with the Government of Sudan, on 25 November 2005 the AU and the UN signed MoU on a “lighter” UN assistance package which then developed to “heavy package” and eventually in January 1, 2008, UNAMID officially took over peacekeeping operations from AMIS.\(^{140}\) The net effect of this transition was an increase in the presence of peacekeepers. This was necessary in fulfilling the mandate of protecting civilians.

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\(^{133}\) Murithi, (2008),p.76
\(^{134}\) Ibid
\(^{135}\) Arvid Ekengard, (2008),p.7
\(^{136}\) Ibid, p.14
\(^{138}\) Communiqué of the PSC, (20 October 2004)
\(^{139}\) Security Council Report, (10 May 2011),p.18
\(^{140}\) Ibid, p.19
UNAMID: Structure and operations

Structurally, UNAMID is headed by a Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur who is jointly appointed by the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission.141 Notably, the Force Commander, as per the Abuja Communiqué, is exclusively African.142 This caters for the political interest of mainly the host country. Sudan had insisted on a mission with an “African character.” However, the UN director of administration leads the mission support division; basically tasked with implementing operational directives.143 So, the UN was to play a lead role in administration. Exactly, the joint report states that, “the overall management of the operation will be based on United Nations standards, principles and established practices.”144 Nevertheless, the AU-UN relationship has not always been very clear from the beginning of the hybrid operation.145

Relevant components of UNAMID include: the political affairs component whose role is to support the peace process and good offices; the civil affairs component tasked with implementation of the Peace Agreement and any other subsequent reconciliation process; the military component, the police component, the DDR component, and the humanitarian component.146 These components reveal the wide scope, tasks and mandate of UNAMID.

Operationally, the deployment of UNAMID troops was well behind schedule. On December 31, 2007, UNAMID was established; however, by the end of July 2008, only 7,967 troops had been deployed out of the projected 19,555 personnel.147 Raising troops and rapidly deploying was not the only operational challenge, finding well equipped troops for UNAMID was a problem too. One reason is that Resolution 1769 provided for a predominantly “African character” in the mission. Yet, owing to a lack of resources, most African countries do not have well equipped

141 UNSC: Report of the Secretary-General and the AU Commission (5 June 2007), para.56, p.16
142 Ibid, para.57,p.16
143 Ibid
144 Ibid
145 Anyidoho in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012).p. 45
146 See UNSC: Report of the Secretary-General and the AU Commission (5 June 2007)
and ready-to-deploy troops. The countries that pledged troops had to rely on Western donors in order to deploy.  

Furthermore, Sudan government blocked equipment at customs and even literally refused and increased red-tape against entry of entire national contingents for UNAMID citing the “African character clause.” Sweden and Norway withdrew their pledges to contribute troops to UNAMID after they were frustrated by the Sudanese government; also Nepalese peacekeepers were rejected.

Eventually, UNAMID was deployed without a comprehensive peace agreement and the situation has remained so to-date. This is because the Darfur peace agreement was signed by only the government of Sudan and the Mini Minawe faction of the SLM; while the others like JEM remained out. Definitely, this has led to violence even against the mission. A UNAMID supply convoy was attacked in West Darfur, destroying a cargo truck, damaging an armoured personnel carrier and critically wounding a driver.

Elsewhere, the political process was jeopardised and tensions heightened after the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Al-Bashir, an issue the UN side supported while the AU side opposed it. Here, the indictment of President Bashir by the ICC has not only increased security tension and affected the peace process, but also strained relations between AU and UN, definitely to the detriment of UNAMID. The Sudan government has hardened its stance against UNAMID and even expelled humanitarian agencies from the country.

In 2008, two mechanisms were instituted to address these partnership challenges. First, a tripartite Mechanism on Darfur comprising of the Sudan government, the AU and UN was established, and held periodic meetings. However, issues considered by the tripartite meetings

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148 Anyidoho in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012), p. 45  
150 Africa Action Report, (January 2008)  
151 Anyidoho in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012), p. 46  
152 Ibid  
took time to be concluded if not, remained unresolved for a very long time. Later in November 2008, the Joint Support and Coordination of Mechanism for UNAMID was established at the AU headquarters. But tensions between the AU and the UN within UNAMID continue to pop-up occasionally. Later, on 8 April 2011, for the first time, the AU sought to mandate a task to UNAMID directly without the agreement of the Security Council. In a communiqué the AU proposed 1 May 2011 as the start date for “Darfur political Process” and requested UNAMID to prioritise this.

Encouragingly, by July 2013, UNAMID’s total uniformed personnel strength was 21,600. This made a positive impact on the ground. One advantage is that with the UN engagement in the hybrid arrangement more troops were contributed. Also, the partnership has enabled the AU to benefit from the large budget of the UN, thus enhancing AU’s capacity. Many AU senior officials under UNAMID have gained knowledge transfer due to this proximity or working relationship. This applies to technological transfer too. To facilitate communication between UN Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) and AU headquarters, the UN provided a video-teleconference facility to AU in Addis Ababa.

Similarly, UNAMID model provides mutual legitimacy especially in mediation. The rebels saw the AU as pushing Bashir’s agenda. Contrastingly, the Sudan government was opposed to UN presence. Therefore, the joint operation mutually strengthened legitimacy of the two organisations. For example, the UN lent political support to the AU by spending the first 6 months of the mediation convincing some parties to accept the AU’s role, while partnership with the AU enabled the UN to intervene despite Sudan’s opposition.

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154 Anyidoho in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012), p. 48
156 Ibid
157 Williams, (2013), p. 2
158 Boutellis and Williams, (2003), p. 12
159 Linnéa et al in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012), p. 96
160 Anyidoho in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012), p. 51
161 Linnéa et al in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012), p. 96
162 Ibid, p. 92
163 Ibid
Thus, did such collaboration, though forced by circumstances, have lessons for the AU in particular and the UN?

**Lessons Learnt**

The first lesson for the AU is that deployment of peace operations in a violent conflict zone is unwise and unproductive, if such an operation is not part of a viable political process for mediating peace. In Darfur, the AU and the UN operated in a highly polarised society. The reason being not all the parties had signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, which UNAMID was tasked to oversee its implementation. Consequently, the violence continued with attacks on UNAMID convoys and staff making it difficult for the mission to protect civilians leave alone themselves.

Similarly, another lesson is about how to operate in a context where the consent of a host state is not forthcoming or is conditional. The lesson is that peacekeepers should not be deployed without genuine and active cooperation from the concerned host government. This is more crucial, when the host state is strong. It is prudent to avoid crossing the so called “Darfur line”; meaning risky deployment without real consent by the host state.”

164 Underrating state consent is costly and very frustrating to peace operations.

Consequently, a practical lesson would be how to creatively circumvent such intransigence of a strong state or how to negotiate with such states so as to obtain consent or maximise on the narrow consent given. A hybrid model is one such creativity that saw the UN become part of the peace operation despite the Sudan government’s resistance. So, a partnership avails to the AU and UN mutual political support crucial where a state such as Sudan is very suspicious, obstructs and violates agreements and UNSC resolutions.  

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Another relevant lesson for the AU is that peace operations are basically political processes; often played at the highest level in the Security Council. The role of China in securing the consent from Sudan was indeed played at the UNSC. It is apparent that political and commercial interests of great powers at the UNSC continue to shape the mode of operations and approaches to security and peace in Africa. Consequently, the AU’s representation and advocacy at the UN in New York should be enhanced in the same way the UN’s presence at AU in Addis Ababa has taken root through initiatives like UN Office to the AU (UNOAU).

Likewise, a worthwhile lesson for the AU is to note that global decisions elsewhere can have drastic security impact on peace operations in Africa. One such decision was the indictment of an African head of state, Sudan’s Bashir. The ICC dimension is considered by the AU as selective and counterproductive to peace support operations on the continent.\textsuperscript{166}

Coordination still remains a running lesson in AU and even UN interventionism. Here, the AU suffers from both its own internal coordination challenges and coordination challenges with the well resourced and experienced UN in such an asymmetrical partnership. For instance, UNAMID decisions took long and at times, disagreements and protracted negotiations occurred over the selection of senior mission leaders. Thus, in a hybrid operation, the AU should invest in professional planning and consultations with UN to achieve unity of purpose.

Still, the AU should invest more in the capacity of its personnel through recruitment of the best and continuous training or capacity-building programmes. The deficit in AU’s staff was highlighted during the partnership with the large professional UN staff.\textsuperscript{167} This, with financial weakness, provides a general lesson that in such hybrid partnerships, political and resource capacity determines the course and implementation of a mission. Recognising this reality is essential in having proper burden sharing.

\textsuperscript{166} Banseka in Linnéa et al, (2012) p.74
\textsuperscript{167} See Anyidoho in Linnéa et al (eds), ( 2012)
Further, future interventions will be better if it was understood from the onset that AU-UN collaboration should not be about structures and institutions only. But it should be well grounded on harmonising or first identifying philosophical differences between the organizations. Emerging from UNAMID are differences on the role of a political process and the place of justice such as ICC in a peace process. The UN philosophy is to intervene where there is a comprehensive peace or political process, and it embraces the role of ICC in Sudan. But, the AU’s philosophy is to intervene and establish a political process, and it is opposed to the ICC dimension in Africa.

Essentially, there is a need to thoroughly analyse the ramifications of clauses in resolutions, whether from the Security Council or PSC. Specifically, two clauses in the UNSC resolution establishing UNAMID were inimical to the peace operations. First, the sovereignty of Sudan was given prominence; where UNAMID was to perform its tasks “without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.”168 Here, Sudan was able to control the mission, compelling UNAMID to engage the government in most of the mission activities.169 This is despite the Sudan government being an aggressive actor in the Darfur conflict and obstructing UNAMID operations. Secondly, the clause on reserving an “African character” in UNAMID impeded the mission. First, it became hard for the AU to fulfil this requirement especially in raising sufficient number of troops. Also, the clause was exploited by the government of Sudan to delay, even block troop contributions and frustrate support to the mission.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has revealed that inasmuch as peace operations are meant for the common good of international peace and security, they also present an opportunity for global actors to propagate their political interest. As Boutellis and Williams affirm, “both the UNSC and AU’s PSC have vested interest in conducting more effective peace operations in Africa;” yet they continue to

168 UNSC: Report, (5 June 2007), para.54(b), p.13
169 Anyidoho in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012),p.92
disagree on how to approach peace and security challenges in Africa.\textsuperscript{170} Due to different philosophies and political interest of powerful member states, operations in a hybrid context have been strained and potentially destabilizing as each organization attempts to influence events in its favour.\textsuperscript{171}

In this chapter, the AU-UN hybrid mission in Darfur has been examined. UNAMID provides a new approach, which involves co-deployment by both organisations. UNAMID has revealed positive and negative lessons. Key issues that emerged in this respect include the dilemma of limited consent from a host state, UN-AU technical and staff knowledge transfer, coordination and rivalry between the AU and the UN over mission appointments and leadership and a whole new dimension of ICC on the peace operation.

Currently, negotiations are on-going to have a comprehensive peace agreement. In a recent attack on 13 July 2013, seven peacekeepers were killed and 17 others injured.\textsuperscript{172} This reveals the unstable context in which UNAMID is operating. But, so far, the mission has been able to contribute to the protection of civilians, facilitated the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and promoted reconciliation efforts at the local level.\textsuperscript{173}

Since UNAMID was established in July 31, 2007, the collaboration still holds. Indeed, on 30 July 2013, the Security Council renewed the mandate of UNAMID until 31 August 2014.\textsuperscript{174} There have been mixed reactions to the success and future of a hybrid model. From the ongoing debate, the UN is not likely to propose this approach again. However, the AU supports hybrid missions as a model for peacekeeping in Africa.\textsuperscript{175} Perhaps, it is too early to conclusively judge the hybrid model. Yet, what appears important is the utility of the lessons learnt from such models; both as a legacy and for future interventions.

\textsuperscript{170} Boutellis and Williams, (2013), p.1
\textsuperscript{171} Banska, (2012), p. 73
\textsuperscript{172} UN Security Council, Resolution 2113 (2013)
\textsuperscript{173} UN Security Council, Report (12 July 2013), p.14
\textsuperscript{174} UN Security Council, Resolution 2113 (2013)
\textsuperscript{175} Linnéa et al (eds), (2012)p.32
The next chapter apparently indicates a different story about the future of hybrid missions. It looks at another model of interventionism that is driven by the AU with support from the UN.
Chapter Four

No Peace to Keep: The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Introduction

In this chapter, the choice of AMISOM is influenced by two factors. First, Somalia presents a first case where AU intervenes in a state whose institutions are virtually collapsed. Here, the challenge is how to contrive political reconstruction in the absence of a strong or clear-cut political authority.\(^{176}\) Therefore, as Mayall puts, for whom or against who was the mandate to be enforced?\(^{177}\) Secondly, although AMISOM was launched and is controlled by the AU, it has revealed a renewed confidence in the ability of the AU by its partners. Interestingly, external support to AMISOM is argued to involve more partnerships than any other post-Cold War peace-operation.\(^{178}\)

As Adebajo posits, “Somalia was an orphan of the Cold War.”\(^{179}\) Following its loss of both US and Soviet patronage, the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre collapsed. With the regime collapsing, the Somali state collapsed, too. “The state had collapsed because Somalis had elevated their clan and sub-clan loyalties above even a minimal commitment to public order.”\(^{180}\)

Several efforts by external actors were continuously unsuccessful. Particularly, the intervention by the UN in 1992 and later the US were early debacles of interventionism in Somalia. The UN

\(^{176}\) Lewis and Mayall in Berdal and Economides (eds), (2007), p.109  
\(^{177}\) Mayall in Berdal and Economides (eds), (2007), p.21  
\(^{178}\) Boutellis and Williams, (2013), p.15  
\(^{179}\) Adebajo, (2011), p.173  
\(^{180}\) Mayall, in Berdal and Economides (eds), (2007), p.21
Operation in Somali (UNOSOM) could not improve the situation given its military observer status. Later in the same year, a UN resolution authorised the deployment of a Unified Task Force (UNITAF), under the command of the US. UNITAF recorded some success as per mandate; securing essential supply routes for humanitarian relief. Nonetheless, in March 1993, UNITAF was transformed into UNOSOM II, retaining four thousand US troops.

However, following military disasters in which twenty four Pakistani UN peacekeepers and eighteen US soldiers were killed, the US and later UN withdrew leaving Somalia as chaotic as they had found it. After the end of the UN mission in 2005, the instability continued for a decade and half, until the AU deployed AMISOM in 2007.

This chapter therefore, firstly, looks at the development of African involvement in the Somalia crisis; stretching from sub-regional, over IGAD to AU intervention. Afterwards, it examines the structure and operations of AMISOM. In so doing, it highlights the mandate, activities and experiences of the mission and how the UN and other partners have developed a model of aiding AMISOM. Then, the key lessons learnt so far in this on-going intervention are underscored before the conclusion of the chapter.

**African intervention: IGASOM to AMISOM**

In April 2005 a sub-regional peace initiative under the aegis of the Inter-government Authority for Development (IGAD) created IGAD Peace Support for Somalia (IGASOM). IGAD comprises countries from the greater Horn of Africa, namely: Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea.

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181 Ibid, p.174  
This IGAD regional initiative attempted to revive both the Somalia peace process and political institutions.\textsuperscript{185} This was notably important following the collapse of the Transitional National Government (TNG) which was created after the Arta Peace Conference of 2000 in Djibouti.\textsuperscript{186} After a series of regional peace initiatives the Transition Federal Government (TFG) replaced the TNG. But the TFG continued to face opposition and attacks from insurgents and other armed groups.

Therefore, the AU and the UNSC approved establishment of IGASOM.\textsuperscript{187} On 6 December 2006, the UNSC mandated IGASOM to monitor the implementation of agreements between TFG and its opponents the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC).\textsuperscript{188} However, IGASOM could not attain troop contributions, thus it was not deployed.\textsuperscript{189}

Later, as the Islamists consolidated their strength and became a potential threat, in 2006, Ethiopia supported by the US, militarily intervened in Somalia.\textsuperscript{190} Together with the TFG, Ethiopia dismantled the UIC and took control of Mogadishu until December 2008 when it started withdrawing.\textsuperscript{191} Thus, the creation of AMISOM was seen as an exit strategy for the Ethiopian military that occupied Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{192}

**AMISOM: structure and Operations**

On 19 January 2007, the AU PSC authorised the deployment of AMISOM for six months. Later on 20 February 2007, the UNSC also authorised the deployment of AMISOM.\textsuperscript{193} AMISOM deployment was a short-term measure aimed at securing initial stabilization in Somalia, and then

\textsuperscript{185} Jeng, (2012), p.358
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, p.259
\textsuperscript{188} UN Security Council Resolution 1725, 2006
\textsuperscript{189} Hull and Svesson, (2008), p.24
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid, p.21
\textsuperscript{191} Jeng, (20120,p.260
\textsuperscript{192} Boutellis and Williams, (2013), p.16
\textsuperscript{193} UN Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007)
it “evolves to a United Nations operation that will support the long term stabilization and post-
conflict reconstruction.”

Further, logistical support for AMISOM deployment was based on the “AMIB” model of self-
sustenance by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Meanwhile, the AU was to mobilize 
logistical support and ensure that TCCs are reimbursed. AMISOM’s mandate is to support the 
TFIs in furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, and to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and 
development in Somalia.

Overall, AMISOM is led by the Head of Mission, who is the Special Representative of the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC). The Head of Mission oversees the heads of the 
AMISOM civilian, military, police, and administrative components.

**Operations and challenges**

Upon its launch, AMISOM was to have 8000 troops consisting of both military and civilian 
components. Besides Uganda, several AU members such as Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi and 
Burundi pledged to deploy troops. Save for Uganda and Burundi, the other countries failed to 
deploy due to lack of resources, given the burden laid on TCCs through the self-sustaining 
model. Notably, Burundi was technically ready to deploy but lack of equipment delayed it. On 
1 March 2007, Uganda deployed 1700 troops. Later in January 2008, Burundi deployed its 
final battalion of 850 soldiers, raising AMISOM’s strength to 2613, this against the expected 
number of 8000 as per the mandate.
With time, there was steady flow of humanitarian assistance as AMISOM improved security; and AMISOM field hospital providing crucial medical services to civilians, while stockpiles of weapons are deposited with the mission an indication of the on-going disarmament process.\textsuperscript{201}

However, AMISOM continued to face attacks from insurgents due to its approach of siding with the TFG; something viewed as lack of neutrality by the TFG opponents. This jeopardised humanitarian supplies, especially when the TFG-Ethiopia military alliance used the Mogadishu airport, under control of AMISOM to launch attacks on opponents, in the course killing civilians.\textsuperscript{202} This, as Menkhaus observes, led to a war economy based on humanitarian aid, manipulation and politicization of humanitarian aid; where the insurgents targeted humanitarian agencies, the TFG and AMISOM as one common enemy.\textsuperscript{203}

In response to these challenges, AMISOM shifted its peace support operations to include broadening the peace process to be inclusionary and focusing on conditions to enable Somalis to formulate their own indigenous peacebuilding programmes.\textsuperscript{204} This followed a realisation that neo-liberal “templates”, prescribed and implemented by international actors, had failed.\textsuperscript{205} But, transformative peacebuilding approaches are expensive and require long-term engagement. The AU, as a young evolving organization, is not sufficiently resourced nor institutionally developed to engage in this process alone. It requires external support.

Generally, between March 2007 and mid-2011, AMISOM was embroil in the violent wars between TFG and its opponents mainly al-Shabaab. However, the mission was able to hold its lines due to increased financial support from donor countries, majorly the EU, which through its African Peace Facility institution paid allowances to AMISOM troops.\textsuperscript{206} Concurrently, TCCs continued to receive bilateral support packages from various donors notably the US.\textsuperscript{207} Indeed,

\textsuperscript{201} AMISOM Newsletter,(2008), p.5
\textsuperscript{202} Jeng, (2012), p.262
\textsuperscript{203} See Menkhaus, (2010), pp.320-341
\textsuperscript{204} Jeng , (2012), p.262
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid
\textsuperscript{206} Boutellis and Williams, (2013), p.16
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid
some argue that the deployment of troops to AMISOM by TCCs has not actually been self-sustaining, in the sense that AU partners have provided almost everything from equipment, over airlifts and to the training of troops.\textsuperscript{208} For instance, US contributed in airlifting, sustenance and equipment logistics to Uganda.\textsuperscript{209}

Yet, the communication and coordination between AU and UN became a challenge. At the beginning, when there was no chief administrative officer of AMISOM in the mission area, the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) had no choice but to engage force headquarters directly.\textsuperscript{210} This created problems because decisions did not originate from official coordinators. Officially, the Head of Mission and UNSOA director are identified as AU and UN coordinators respectively. Also, there were complications whenever UNSOA occasionally engaged with TCCs direct without the necessary involvement of AU Peace Support Operations Division or AMISOM.\textsuperscript{211}

Unfortunately, one of the most worrying challenges facing AMISOM is the high casualty rate. It has been argued that AMISOM has lost more troops than any other mission in the 50 years of UN peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{212} Media reports quoted U.N. Deputy Secretary General Jan Eliasson to have estimated the casualty number as totalling to almost 3,000 AMISOM troops killed since seven years of the mission’s deployment.\textsuperscript{213} A combination of factors has been identified. Among the external factors are the high intensity of the conflict, the insurgents’ armament and tactics, and the terrain; while internal factors include poor command and control mechanisms, insufficient training, inappropriate equipment and poor intelligence.\textsuperscript{214}

Elsewhere, AMISOM forces have been blamed for failing to discriminate between civilian and rebel objects. This situation has been made worse by al-Shabaab’s tactic of using civilian populations as human shields in their war against AMISOM and TFG. Of major concern is that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{208} Hull and Svesson, (2008), p.29
\item \textsuperscript{209} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{210} Gadin in Linnéa et al (eds), ( 2012),p.79
\item \textsuperscript{211} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{212} Linnéa et al in Linnéa et al (eds), ( 2012),p. 99
\item \textsuperscript{213} allAfrica.com, (11 May 2013)
\item \textsuperscript{214} Linnéa et al in Linnéa et al (eds), ( 2012),p. 99
\end{itemize}
AMISOM had not adopted a mission-wide protection-of-civilians strategy until late May 2013.\textsuperscript{215} Thus AMISOM itself became a threat to civilians rather than their protector.

Notwithstanding the challenges, AMISOM operations have had positive achievements. In August 2011 AMISOM was able to finally break the military stalemate with the al-Shabaab insurgents when they forced the group out of central Mogadishu. In late 2011, this achievement was bolstered by independent military interventions of Kenyan and Ethiopian forces against al-Shabaab. Strategically, AMISOM capitalised on these developments to absorb the Kenya Defence forces (KDF), and with Djiboutian and Sierra Leonean troops joining, its force strength grew to 17,731 personnel.\textsuperscript{216} With the help of AMISOM, in September 2012 a new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) replaced TFG. As of June 2013, AMISOM forces were deployed in four sectors across south and central Somalia where they continue to counter sporadic attacks from al-Shabaab fighters.\textsuperscript{217}

**Lessons learnt**

Generally, AMISOM presents unique lessons in the evolution of AU interventionism.

To begin with, a painful lesson is that the mission has lost a very high number of its troops. The high rate of casualties teaches an important lesson on how and when to intervene. On which side should the AU intervene given the weakness of the state and government? Where there is a strong government and state, the AU mission can use the existing infrastructure to avoid casualties and make their intervention successful. It is apparent that in an environment of statelessness and weak central government, interventionism should aspire to be as neutral and inclusionary in its peace process as possible. Indeed, there is a great need to continue engaging all stake holders in Somalia instead of focusing only on propping the central government. This will help to dissuade al-Shabaab fighters from perceiving AMISOM as biased and a party to the conflict. But, importantly, the AU interventionism should invest in troop training and better

\textsuperscript{215} Williams, (13 August 2013),
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid
equipment as well as intelligence services, meant to counter groups using terrorist tactics in warfare.

Also, investing in a mix of both institutional development and indigenisation of the peace process shall positively contribute to the improvement of the situation in Somalia. This calls for the AU to develop a model for driving the peace process which is not constricted by the neo-liberal peacebuilding templates and instead, like in Burundi, involve traditional social institutions.

Therefore, a vital lesson for AU is that interventions need to be anchored on a comprehensive peace agreement or at least one being brokered. The UN, in its insistence on peace agreements before intervention, appears to have learnt this lesson during its experience of over seventy-years. The high casualty rate should take the AU back to this lesson.

The clarity of mandate to match the situation on the ground is another key lesson. This requires thorough assessment of the situation before drafting mandates. So, entering Somalia without a strong mandate for peace enforcement made AMISOM vulnerable to the terrorist activities of al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups. It was not until November 2012, that AMISOM was authorised to conduct peace enforcement operations.²¹⁸

Similarly, mandate was a challenge to AMISOM when it came to the protection of civilians. Since its launch in 2007, protection of civilians was not part of AMISOM’s tasks until May 2013. In the meantime the mission faced challenges in terms of reducing civilian casualties as they battled with al-Shabaab. Worse enough, as a tactic, al-Shabaab used populations as shields and forced civilians to remain in dangerous areas of the city, so as to deliberately increase the harm to civilians caused by AMISOM.²¹⁹ This warfare tactic is meant to make the AU mission unpopular among the public, hence strengthen peoples support for the insurgents.

²¹⁸ UN Security Council, Resolution 2073 (2012)
²¹⁹ Williams, (2013)
There is a need to review the “self-sustaining concept” (Burundi model), where TCCs deploy through self-sustaining mechanisms. This has created coordination and financial problems. The bilateral funding arrangements can potentially cause the problem of double reimbursement to the TCCs. Similarly as partners engage directly with TCCs, the AU risks being both isolated and not having its capacity developed. But, a perturbing consequence of the “Burundi model” is its impact on slowing troop contribution, as most African countries are as low resourced as the AU is.\(^2\)

AU member states need to channel their peace and security efforts through the AU, by avoiding individual state interventions and by contributing steadily and adequately to the AU peace fund. Actually, the need for strengthening AU capacity to operationalise the African Standby Force (ASF) is currently imperative. This calls for the collaboration and sharing the peace and security burden between the AU and relevant sub-regional organizations (RECs) as planned in the establishment of ASF.

Interestingly, it emerged that AMISOM’s capacity challenges eventually became not about having enough money, but about their capacity to utilize available donations.\(^1\) Here, AMISOM has revealed an unprecedented model of support to the AU by external partners. There is an informal tripartite of division of labour. The AU leads the operations and receives major funding from the UN, on one side, and the EU as well as a variety of other partners, on the other. For example, the UN provides logistical support such as equipment, training and capacity services, while the EU pays allowances to AMISOM’s uniformed personnel.\(^2\) With this increasing financial support from multiple international partners, the AU really needs to consider enhancing its institutional capacity to absorb and effectively utilize funds.

But, there is a tendency to engage in capacity substitution rather than capacity building; especially where the AU lacks counterparts during support arrangements with the UN and other

\(^2\)Hull and Svesson, (2008), p.42
\(^1\)Ibid, p.43
\(^2\)Boutellis and Williams, (2013), p.16
international partners.\textsuperscript{223} Thus the AU should have a fully-fledged planning team that can identify and seal the gaps that exists in these support arrangements. This goes along with the need for the AU to recruit more staff.

Finally, when there is a clear understanding and coordination between AU-UN arrangements much can be done no matter how intractable the situation. The establishment of the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) so as to deliver the logistical support to AMISOM followed by an MoU of collaboration signed between the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat in March 2009; took the AU-UN relationship to the next level and facilitated effective delivery on the ground.\textsuperscript{224}

**Conclusion**

Progressively, AMISOM demonstrates the AU’s efforts towards “African solutions to African problems.” This is illustrated by the AU’s decision to intervene in Somalia despite the raging war and state collapse. Furthermore, this came after a long absence of international presence in Somali following the withdrawal of the UN and US failed intervention.

Accordingly, the AU intervention in Somalia has a variety of lessons both negative and positive. This chapter has examined these lessons through a number of issues which include; the high rate of AMISOM casualty; issue of impartiality in interventions, organisational capacity of AU to absorb flow of donor funds; mandates, terror tactics and civilian protection; role of neighbouring countries in interventions; multidimensional support from a mix of donors and the issue of AMISOM transitioning to a UN mission.

AMISOM has made substantial progress in tackling the security situation in Somalia. Certainly, the fact that on 3 June 2013, the UN deployed its Assistance Mission (UNSOM) to Mogadishu, unlike UNSOM’s predecessor UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) which was based in

\textsuperscript{223} Gadin, (2012), p.82
\textsuperscript{224} Gadin in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012), p.76
Nairobi,\textsuperscript{225} is sign enough that AMISOM has progressed in creating conditions necessary for UN engagement in Somalia. Further, with the new Federal Government of Somalia in place and al-Shabaab fighters out of central city Mogadishu, the AU has been emboldened to reduce if not abandon its frequent calls for the UN to replace AMISOM.

Yet, the experience of AMISOM is an on-going huge laboratory of studying the structural weaknesses of the AU. An example is weak planning and institutional capacity to timely utilise flows of large finances. The AU needs to develop its capacity both in the peace operations and the headquarters.

As the mission has become multi-dimensional, the political process needs more emphasis as much as the military dimension. In so doing, regional inter-state dynamics should be taken into account. For instance, Kenya sees a favourable administration in Jubba region of Somalia as a buffer against al-Shabaab and a better exit strategy. But the government of Somalia is opposed to Kenya’s choice of ally; yet, Somalia cannot afford to lose Kenya’s contingent in AMISOM.\textsuperscript{226}

The situation in Somalia is still relatively violent and unstable. A new wave of attacks in July-August 2013 pushed a long serving humanitarian organization in Somalia, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to close its activities in the country. There were extreme attacks to the organization’s staff, where humanitarian aid workers are killed, assaulted, and abducted.\textsuperscript{227}

Currently, the will to “re-hatting” AMISOM into a UN mission is low. International actors still see the Somalia environment as unconducive for a UN peacekeeping mission. But it is also argued that a transition would be costly and destabilising to any progress so far made in the peace process.\textsuperscript{228}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{225} Security Council Report, (July 2003)
\item \textsuperscript{226} Ibid, p.21
\item \textsuperscript{227} AFP, (15 August 2013)
\item \textsuperscript{228} Gadin in Linnéa et al (eds), (2012),p.82
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Thus, the way forward is to maintain AMISOM as it is, and strengthen the tripartite model of supporting AU especially to cater for both military and civilian components of AMISOM. Meanwhile, arguments in favour of a UN mission in Somalia or perhaps a “hybrid mission” such as that in Darfur should be shelved and more focus put on supporting AU capacity-building efforts.
Chapter Five

Conclusion: AU interventionism yesterday, today and tomorrow

The African Union has gained considerable experience in interventionism in the past decade. In the course of these experiences fundamental lessons from which to learn have emerged too.

This paper has examined three cases where the AU deployed peace support operations, namely AMIB, UNAMID and AMISOM. The choice of the three cases is fascinating, yet informative in the sense that they provide different scenarios in which the AU has attempted to intervene in conflicts within a member state. Moreover, these case studies present various dimensions by which international partners, particularly the UN, have supported and collaborated with the AU on peace and security in Africa.

From AMIB, the importance of collective political will by neighbouring states and the role of a lead state in AU intervention became clear. On its part, UNAMID highlights a broad lesson on consent and intervention especially in a strong obstructive state like Sudan. It also reveals lessons on AU-UN partnership on peace and security agenda. AMISOM presents a need for reflection on how to intervene in a weak or collapsed state. This is so, given the high casualty rate of AMISOM troops. It also reveals a new form of donor support for AU interventionism by a mix of many partners. Further, the three cases reveal a progressive AU-UN relationship. For AMIB, the AU was eager to hand over to the UN; while in UNAMID they co-deployed; and for AMISOM, the UN is supporting the AU which is leading the mission.

Largely, the chapter reflects on the past, present and future of the AU interventionism. It highlights the common issues that have emerged from the three cases examined.
Overall, this paper has revealed the following five issues to ponder, if not learn from: how and when to deploy and sustain peace support operations, the division of labour between the AU and the UN, capacity-building at AU headquarters, the role of member states in AU’s peace support operations, and the role of peace processes in mission operations.

First, at issue with deploying and sustaining peace support operations is whether or not the AU has logistical and financial capacity to conduct peace operations on its own. Generally, as far as deploying and sustaining peace support operations is concerned, the picture is grim. Individual member states are grappling with their own resource problems. This makes it difficult for them to effectively embrace the “concept of self-sustaining” in troop contributions. Between 2008 and 2011, African states provided only 2 per cent of the AU’s Peace Fund; the rest came from international donors.229

Ultimately, AU’s dependency on external resources denies it the freedom to take independent decisions, and puts the Union in an awkward position of juggling African and external partners’ interests. But others argue that the UN has the primary responsibility for international peace and security; therefore it should not shift this responsibility to regional actors like the AU.230 In an interview Cilliers captures this strand of thought concisely:

“We cannot sustain large peacekeeping missions; this is an international responsibility. Africa can assist; it can build towards a peace process as it did in Somalia and in Burundi. But our exit strategy is to hand over to a UN mission.”231

Nonetheless, the AU is yet to develop a distinct intervention paradigm. Currently, it relies on ad hoc negotiations to initiate peace agreements, then it uses the “concept of self-sustaining” to deploy a small contingent with a view of transitioning to a UN mission or receiving support from UN and external partners. Encouragingly, the UN and other international partners have

231 Cilliers, (July 08, 2013)
developed various informal support mechanisms to build and sustain AU capacity as well as peace operations.  

It is precisely for this latter argument that the second issue is considered, that is, division of labour between the two organisations. In peace operations, an informal division of labour is that the AU, which is less risk averse, focuses on the Security dimension of the crisis, while the UN undertakes the peace or political process. Hence the AU intervenes first to establish a ceasefire, and then the UN takes over to engage in the more expensive peacebuilding process. This informal division of labour illustrates that the two organizations have realised that a “productive burden sharing could be key to addressing many of the problems” of African and international peace and security. This relationship is definitely of greater benefit to the inadequately resourced AU, and it fits well into UN’s ten year programme of building AU’s capacity.

The third broad issue about AU interventionism is capacity-building. It has been argued in this paper that the UN and international partners have concentrated too much on supporting peace operations, while giving little consideration to capacity-building at AU headquarters. For instance, in 2004, when AMIS first deployed to Darfur, its headquarters personnel numbered just two dozen, and in 2007, the Strategic Management Unit for AMISOM had only eight of 35 proposed staff.

Vines observes that the AU is trying to conduct many issues on the continent, yet its “staff is small and of variable aptitude,” hence the most effective personnel are over-loaded with work. Worse still, an AU audit report affirms that at the headquarters there is lack of supervision, poor delegation resulting in micro-management and inability to retain experienced staff. The Report

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236 High Level Panel of the Audit Report, (18 Dec. 2007)
found that the AU Commission was characterized by “internal institutional incoherence with a dysfunctional working and managerial culture at all levels.”

Therefore, AU capacity-building that only invests in training and equipping peacekeepers may not improve future performance in the field of peace and security, if this is not matched with improving capacity at headquarters. This is why, for instance, the AU has designed a comprehensive African peace and security architecture (APSA), but, most of APSA’s structures are yet to be fully operational.

At this juncture, one may ask: what is the role of AU member states? This is the fourth issue arising from the analysis of AU interventionism in this paper. As mentioned earlier, African states struggle to offer resources for AU interventionism. Arguably, this may be understandable; however, the challenge is that the political will of African states to support AU peace operations also remains dismal. It has been argued that some of the national defence budgets of African states prove that lack of resources may not exactly be the sole and exclusive problem.

This political reluctance is made worse by member states militarily intervening in neighbouring countries bypassing the AU even where it has a mission in place. Examples include Kenya and Ethiopia’s military incursions in Somalia, and Rwanda’s continued support of rebel groups in DRC.

Finally, another issue is the role of peace processes in ensuring the success of AU intervention. The case studies reveal that where there is a comprehensive peace agreement to guide the peace process, then the entire mission operations achieve a lot. However, AU peace support operations are often conducted in environments where there is no comprehensive peace agreement. The peace process is also not often sufficiently developed because much focus is on the operations of

\[237\] Ibid
\[238\] Murithi, (2009), p.105
\[239\] Vorrath, (2012), p.3
troops. Therefore, AU’s interventionism by way of mediation, reconciliation and peacebuilding need a closer focus during peace support operations.

So, what is the way forward? Member states will have to start viewing the AU as a vessel or tool for collective action. The AU should also engage sub-regional organisations for they are the building-blocks for AU’s regional strength. The development of APSA depends on the commitment of the RECs. For instance it is envisaged that each of the five RECs, will have 5000 soldiers, which in total will comprise the African Standby Force. It will be necessary for the AU to revisit the comprehensive MoU signed with the RECs in 2008, which aims to enhance and streamline their cooperation on the implementation of the continent’s peace and security agenda. But, evidently the commitment of RECs to AU leadership is in doubt. Additionally, RECs too face many similar problems of the AU. The role of RECs in AU interventionism is another area for future research.

To avoid being undermined and misunderstood, the AU should develop its public diplomacy, especially at the UN headquarters. This entails ability to strongly articulate a timely, consistent and united voice on matters of peace and security in Africa. Likewise, the AU needs to communicate to its constituents on the continent better. The AU’s numerous challenges were clearly evident in the Libya crisis of 2011. Lack of strategy and coordination, lack of one voice and position on issues and poor public diplomacy, made it easy for external actors to undercut mediation efforts by the AU to find a “bloodless” political solution in Libya.

The current breed of conflicts in Africa; Mali, Darfur, Guinea-Bissau, DRC and Somalia among others, provide valuable lessons and an indication that AU’s role on the continent is far from declining. Some of these conflicts require new innovations in AU interventionism. For instance, popular uprisings such as witnessed in Egypt, have complicated the understanding of unconstitutional change of government, making it a challenge for AU to intervene.

Yet, the AU alone cannot solve a myriad of peace and security challenges blighting Africa. However, it provides a vital entry-point for the member states, the UN and other international partners to maximise their contributions to peace and security in Africa. But, a challenge growing here is how to differentiate between developing AU’s own capacity and the capacity provided from outside, mainly by the UN. This raises the question of whether international support is leading to capacity-building or capacity-substitution.

Generally, the two organizations have shown considerable progress in strengthening their collaboration in tackling peace and security challenges in Africa. However, this relationship continues to resemble a fluctuating graph. On 25 April 2013, the UNSC passed resolution 2100 mandating the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to take over from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). On the same day, the AU condemned the UN resolution as “not being in consonance with the spirit of partnership the AU and the UN have been striving to promote for many years,” saying that the AU was not appropriately consulted in the drafting and adoption process of the 2100 UNSC resolution. This friction is bound to continue. Ultimately, the division of roles between the two organisations will be less clear as the AU develops its capacity. Thus, on peace operations in Africa, if both eventually have considerable capacity, the question will no longer be who is willing to do what, but rather who is better at it?

Thus, a critical policy question for the global community is whether to further enhance the UN’s ability and willingness to respond to crises in Africa or better build the capacity of the AU to enable a regional response? A valid answer would be to enhance the collaboration between the two so that, in due course, the AU’s capacity will be developed. The emerging support and collaborative relationship between the AU, UN, EU and RECs, with other partners should be encouraged, improved, and strengthened. African stability is a major building block to greater international peace and security; therefore, a global-regional partnership is of utmost importance.

241 Security council Report, (July 2013), p.10
242 PSC Communiqué (25 April, 2013), para.,10
243 See Boutellis and Williams, (May 15, 2013)
All in all, intergovernmental organisations like the AU are created by states. Hence, their success or failure, future development or demise; are ultimately in the hands of the states that constitute them. Eventually, the evolution and progress of AU interventionism will depend on the political will of member states to support and act through the AU as a mode of collective security.

Lessons might have been learnt or noted, but the AU is yet to generate the ability to effectively address them. The way forward now is for the AU member states to begin propagating “African solutions to African problems” through developing the capacity of AU interventionism. With strengthened AU interventionism, the African Union will therefore become “a Union of the peoples of Africa and not only a Union of African States and Government;” true human security.

Finally, fifty years after the formation of the OAU in 1963, the ideology of “Pan-Africanism” that drove the quest for African unity has been rekindled. In May 2013 while celebrating the golden jubilee of the OAU/AU establishment, the guiding theme was “Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance”. So, African states will have to come to the realisation that a conflict in one of the member states will affect the rest in the continent in one way or another. Thus, being a “brother’s keeper”, by supporting and acting collectively through the AU interventionism for the common good of the whole is after all, the true meaning of “pan-Africanism and African renaissance.”

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244 Claude Jr.,(1971), p. 110
245 High Level Panel of the Audit Report,(18 December, 2007), p.197
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